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On Reviewing the Right to Fair Procedure
By HENRY MAXWELL RIGNEY
LIB. (Hons.), University of Tasmania, 1979; LL.M., Harvard University,
1980, Lecturer in Law, Queensland Institute of Technology Australia.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Argument
This Article examines the rehabilitation of natural justice in
United States administrative law. It is a case for the recognition of the
now neglected bases for the right to question the methods and legality
of the exercise of discretionary power; that is, power beyond the reach
of the Administrative Procedure Act' or legislation similar in function.
In particular, this is a case for the acknowledgment of a broader base
for the right to a hearing in the face of adjudicative action-the fair
procedure right.2
B. Some Premises
The term "fair procedure right" is used in addition to "due pro-
cess" in order to separate the components of due process doctrines into
the rights asserted by persons to be affected by decisions and the corre-
sponding restraints imposed on the decision makers. These comple-
mentary facets are often considered together in judicial comment in a
manner which tends to leave their integrity overlooked. It is the au-
thor's contention that much of the confusion in recent due process law
is the consequence of a dulled consciousness of the nature of these
components. The discussion of the fair procedure right focuses on the
claimant's interest in challenges to decisional procedures. The term has
no existence beyond this argument, and as the discussion develops its
1. The original Act was repealed by Act of Sept. 6, 1966, Pub. L. 89-554. Its current
provisions are codified in 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-56 and §§ 701-03 (1977).
2. This expression is intended to encompass the interests of those persons, faced with
formalized decisions by others weighted with institutional sanctions, in having such deci-
sions reached after rational evaluation of all relevant considerations, with no irrelevant con-
siderations, and after appropriate notice and opportunity for comment and/or cross
examination. The author does not suggest that all those steps are always required, nor that
more procedures are not sometimes required. "Fair procedure right" means the right to just
that bundle of procedures which circumstances bestow in a given adjudication.
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use will be relaxed to invoke the traditional language with hopefully an
enhanced meaning.3
In this discussion, the Commonwealth countries' doctrinal version
of due process-natural justice-is used as an analogy. The fundamen-
tal distinction between the concepts of natural justice and due process
should be noted; it is the distinction between the English theory-the
"Westminster tradition" of constitutional law-and the constitutional
law of the United States governing the scope of judicial review. In sim-
plistic terms, due process runs against the government while natural
justice does not. Having cracked the lid of the judicial review Pan-
dora's box, it will be left for discussion at a later time in the context of
the history of due process interpretation. Its present relevance is in the
presentation of a view of natural justice and due process which sets fair
procedure rights apart from the judicial machinery for their enforce-
ment. In other words, the naked rights based on natural justice are
addressed free of judicial articulation.4
C. The Goals
Where due process provisions are held by the courts not to be ap-
plicable in a given situation, the hearing is not judicially enforced. A
revived awareness of the common law underpinnings of fair procedure
rights can increase the weaponry of those seeking to enforce rights in a
hearing. Such awareness might: 1) establish a claim for another judi-
cial examination of the constitutional base for a hearing claim; and
2) provide an alternative to the constitutional base if the latter cannot
be of assistance.
D. The Field of Play
Judicial interpretation of due process provisions has changed dra-
3. This style of analysis brings with it its own values. Most importantly, it projects an
individual-centered perspective of law in society. The presumption is that due process im-
poses positive forces against adjudicators, emanating from individually held procedural
rights. An alternative perspective might depict adjudicators as being constrained by due
process in the absence of corresponding rights.
4. A functional objection to this dichotomy is that such rights exist only insofar as they
can be judicially enforced. However, while in the English legal system natural justice prima
facie does not run against government, fair procedure rights run against non-government
adjudication and also against government adjudication absent specific exclusion. The West-
minster system legislature is the repository of a veto power over fair procedure rights. Those
rights thus have their own existence, circumscribed in natural justice doctrine while free of
those limits in due process doctrine. This raises the logical inquiry-postponed for later
discussion-as to how far fair procedure rights run against non-government adjudication in
the United States.
[Vol 5
Right to Fair Procedure
matically in recent times. This has resulted from the application of
strict interpretative techniques, such as might be used in interpreting a
complex, technical, or ambiguous statute, to the broad language and
purport of the Constitution.5 Through such a tightly logical interpreta-
tion of due process, the United States Supreme Court has restricted the
range of occasions mandating a hearing. The Court has thus reduced
the input of the judiciary in government interaction with society. Con-
sequently, the power of non-judicial organs of government to exclude
procedural rights has been increased. Apart from the threat of positive
abuse, there emerges also the subtle danger that the non-judicial gov-
ernment's unawareness of its new responsibility which should accom-
pany its power will allow neglect of fair procedure interests. This
contrasts with the traditional approach which relied primarily on the
judiciary for identification of procedural rights. Such a responsibility
was carried as a matter of course by the courts to balance the consider-
ations for and against a hearing right in the issues accompanying sucti
a claim.6
E. The Game Plan
Common law developments in natural justice legal systems show
that such a judicial balancing skill accords with widely accepted demo-
cratic theory parallel to, but sharing the relevant sources of, the Consti-
tution. Therefore, an understanding of common law fair procedure
rights can provide arguments for a change of direction by the Supreme
Court to again create a responsible role for the judiciary in government
application. As a prelude, this article will be concerned with the
Supreme Court's shift to its present position of due process hearings.
The Court's position is given a critical but favored viewing. Where
ambiguity or uncertainty competes with the position proclaimed by the
Court, such derogation is acknowledged while attempting to set out as
strongly as possible the Court's stated position. The proclaimed judi-
cial role-to the extent of convergence of the various perspectives in
the Supreme Court's stated position-will be examined.
As will be seen, that role is one of subordination to other govern-
ment organs. There are two courses available to those in the legal pro-
5. Throughout this article, "the Constitution" refers to the Constitution of the United
States. However, reference will also occasionally be made to the constitutions of the indivi-
dual states.
6. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971); Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 402, 442
(1960); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 163 (1951) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring).
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fession who believe this subordinated role clashes with either
constitutional understanding or basic normative standpoints. One
course is to view the Court's reasoning as incorrect, and thus to chal-
lenge its logic. This view requires the legal practitioner to pick up the
many loose threads left by the recent cases, the more important of
which are pointed out below. The other course is to accept the logic of
the new position, but to challenge logic as the determinant. For those
practitioners following this second course, the case for a hearing can be
strengthened with policy arguments based on the suggestions herein;
the recognition of due process as a linguistic embodiment of natural
justice concepts would allow judicial modification of present attitudes
without retracing the steps of the past decade. As a preliminary step
toward that end, the author will illustrate how the state of the art of
natural justice in appropriate jurisdictions has consolidated at the point
of judicial responsibility. This is the end to which the renewed fair
procedure rights argument must prevail in the United States. The
means to that end is the substance of this Article, which attempts to
identify due process with natural justice. In addition to identifying the
common roots of the international doctrines, judicial applications of
natural justice in the United States will be discussed. This discussion
will also be relevant for the second of the target items listed above: the
assistance which a consciousness of natural justice can provide legal
practitioners in the United States in formulating alternatives to consti-
tutional arguments when stating procedure rights claims.7
F. More Premises
As a final introductory point, the author acknowledges taking an
arguable stance which flows from certain normative assumptions. Of
these, reference to an individual-centered perspective of law in society
has already been made. The second important assumption is that a
right to a hearing has an intrinsic value which should always be
weighed against competing considerations, if any. The justification for
that view is beyond the scope of this Article.' Another normative input
7. This assistance will be obvious in issues which might fall on a state action point.
But, given the state of due process law, the assistance could also be provided in a procedural
claim-clearly against government-which might fail at some other point of the due process
gauntlet. That is, the relevant due process clause need not even be invoked! The fact that
this statement might raise some eyebrows is a reflection of the constitutionality which per-
vades United States legal attitudes. This Article therefore attempts to show that due process
is a nonexclusive particular application of fair procedure rights in United States administra-
tive law.
8. See DuE PRocEss, NoMos XVIII (J. Penock & . Chapman eds. 1977).
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is an implicit ranking of the status of the courts within the democratic
system. Any criticism of the purport of the author's arguments which
results in a conflict with this or similar background value functions
must be met with a demurrer; however, reliance on another assumption
that many of those values will be shared leads to the conclusion that
valuable practical and conceptual assistance for practitioners in the
United States will result from a re-evaluation of natural justice.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF DUE PROCESS IN THE
UNITED STATES
A. The Context of Due Process Invocation
The decade of the seventies is regarded by American legal scholars
as that of the "due process explosion."9 During this time, the hitherto
tranquil development of due process law underwent a quantum
change. The change of pace in judicial analysis involved key issues in
administrative law, issues flowing from an interaction between devel-
opments in the basic institutional structure of United States society and
the "living Constitution."' Unfortunately the explosion has generated
more heat than light, not only among those who seek to observe and
apply the judicial directions, I' but also at the epicentre: between judge
and judge' 2 and from case to case.'
3
Developments in contemporary society are difficult to set out in
value-free language, but some of their qualities are enumerated below.
There is an increasing involvement of government in the administra-
tion of society and the substantive pursuit of the goals of society. There
is also an increasing range of goods and services provided to members
of society by the government and an increasing government monopoly
on the supply of certain goods and services to society. Furthermore,
9. Included among those scholars are: W. GELLHORN, C. BYSE & P. STRAUSS, ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS (7th ed. 1979). That work has provided the point
of departure for this discussion insofar as it is concerned with current due process law. See
also Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. Rnv. 1267, 1268 (1975).
10. See Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REv. 693 (1975-76).
11. Some major contemporary works on due process doctrine are referred to throughout
this Article. In particular, see the views of Professor W. Van Alstyne, note 14 infra, and
Professor H. Monaghan, note 73 infra.
12. Note the polarity of the views in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), and Gross
v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). See also the contrast in the approaches adopted by Judge
Hay of the Second Circuit in Grace Towers Tenants Ass'n. v. Grace Housing Development
Fund Co., 538 F.2d 491 (2d Cir. 1976) and Burr v. New Rochelle Municipal Housing Au-
thority, 479 F.2d 1165 (2d Cir. 1973).
13. See, e.g., the about face from Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974) to Bishop v.
Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
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there is an increasing dominance in the government's control of crucial
intangible resources such as knowledge or technology. To say that
there is an accompanying increase in dependence on government by
members of society is trite, a simple statement of the corollary to the
foregoing. But it needs to be said, for it closely resembles the language
of those who have studied the reasons for the forces within the due
process explosion. 4 At the very least, with more government action
comes the chance of misdirected government action affecting more peo-
ple. The likelihood increases that more people will perceive some gov-
ernment action to be misdirected. Thus, there is also an increased
likelihood that the Constitution will be invoked as a key weapon
against misdirected government action.' 5
B. The Threshold Issue
Due process is guaranteed by the Constitution. The fifth amend-
ment states that "[n]o person shall be. . .deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law. .."16 and the fourteenth amend-
ment provides that: "[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law. . ."' Therein is the
second element in the interaction which forms the backdrop of in-
creased judicial activity in the administrative law exposition. The
Supreme Court view in the last decade is that the due process guaran-
tee applies to challenges of government action only if the action com-
plained of: 1) is sufficiently that of government; 2) impinges on
14. See, e.g., Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Propert' Adjudicative Due Process in
the Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 445, 452 (1977).
15. That invocation has been expedited by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1977) which provides that
a federal right of action is available for state conduct which deprives a person of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution.
16. U.S. CONST. amend V. The full text is:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, un-
less on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the
land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put
in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The full text is:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
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certain interests; and 3) has not been conducted in accordance with
certain procedural standards. For present purposes, the third limita-
tion is not in issue. I" The government action issue is only indirectly on
point; it is a consequence of the argument that, while a fair procedure
right is effective against only government action as a constitutional
matter, it can reach out to constrain non-government action, although
not by virtue of the Constitution. Therefore, the chief concern of this
discussion is with due process threshold questions. 9 So posed, the
thrust of the constitutional analysis is toward an examination of the
nature of the interests safeguarded by the due process clauses.
C. Due Process: Guarantee, Not Grant
The Constitution guarantees protection of life, liberty, and prop-
erty. Note that the wording of the fifth and fourteenth amendments is
not such as to bestow life, liberty, and property as individual rights.
Rather, the protection is expressed in prophylactic terms; the govern-
ment is prevented from depriving one2° of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law. This indicates that government action may
constitutionally infringe upon life, liberty, and property provided that a
suitable procedure which satisfies due process exists and is adopted.
On its face, therefore, the guarantee accorded by the Constitution is a
right to due process rather than a right to life, liberty, or property.
This reading is supported by the legislative history. The champi-
ons of the Bill of Rights sought to guard more effectively against the
powers of the new federal government. 21 Among the interests which
were to be safeguarded were those which had been addressed in the
Magna Carta and later manifestations of limitations on tyrannical
power.' From the language of the British instruments, via the Decla-
ration of Independence, came the protection of life, liberty, and prop-
18. An examination of the doctrines relevant to the content of procedural due process
would be a major, separate work. Until the decision in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564 (1972), discussed in text following note 27, infra, the elucidation of the content of proce-
dural due process was mingled with the question of whether due process was at all activated;
consequently, much of the current literature is addressed to both of these now conceptually
distinct issues-whether at large or within specific interest deprivation.
19. In the current state of due process law, a threshold must be crossed prior to an
examination of administrative procedures which were, or should have been, applied in a
given adjudication.
20. Corporate personality shares due process protection. See, e.g., Olsen v. Nebraska,
313 U.S. 236 (1941).
21. T. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 16 (4th ed. 1931).
22. Id. at 5-8.
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erty.23 The vehicle for this protection was due process of law as
expressed in the amendments. The passage through Congress of the
due process guarantee without debate or an opposing vote24 illustrates
that this language drew from deep common springs in the political
ethos of the new nation. Thus, from the inception of the Bill of Rights,
life, liberty, and property were regarded as. constants, as universal be-
yond need for definition. Until this decade, when judicial analysis has
focused on the meaning of these attributes, any claim of breach of the
due process safeguards were evaluated by use of a balancing test: the
government function under attack was weighed against the private in-
terests of the individual in the pursuit of that function.25 This test has
slipped into the next phase of due process adjudication. Courts now
balance private and public interests when determining what procedures
due process requires in a given application after determining that life,
liberty, or property attributes are at risk.26 This two-step analysis has
derived much of its status from the Roth and Sindermann cases.27
D. The Property Interest: Roth and Sindermann
The requirements of procedural due process apply only to the depri-
vation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment's
protection of liberty and property. When protected interests are im-
plicated, the right to some kind of prior hearing is paramount. But
the range of interests protected by procedural due process is not
infinite.2s
In those terms the United States Supreme Court endorsed an anal-
ysis delineating safeguarded interests.29 Roth and Sindermann each
claimed, in part, deprivation of fourteenth amendment rights in the
23. I. BRANT, THE BILL OF RIGHTs 41(1965).
24. Id. at 64.
25. See, e.g., Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Local 573 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886
(1961). See also Note, Specifying the Procedures Required by Due Process: Toward Limits on
the Use of Interest Balancing, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1510 (1975).
26. Of course it is only the conceptual analysis which asks the questions: 1) is there
government action? 2) is life, liberty, or property at stake? and, 3) has due process been
observed? A judicial decision that due process has been observed might proceed on the
assumption that the first factors in the analysis have been identified in favor of the claimant.
27. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593
(1972).
28. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 569-70.
29. Roth was not the seminal case for that approach. In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471, 481 (1972), the court observed:
The question is not merely the 'weight' of the individual's interest, but whether the
nature of the interest is one within the contemplation of the 'liberty or property'
language of the Fourteenth Amendment. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
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procedures by which petitioners were dismissed from employment.30
To determine the presence of a property interest, the Court in both
cases applied a test that ignored the claimant's subjective regard of the
interest and focused on the means by which that interest was created:
"Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution.
Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing
rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such
as state law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and
that support claims of entitlement to those benefits."31
The property interests, if any, of Roth and Sindermann were therefore
created and defined by the terms of their appointment. While neither
written contract extended more than an interest in employment until
the end of the current year (after which the dismissal was to take ef-
fect), Sindermann was able to point to "rules and understandings,
promulgated and fostered by state officials" to make his case.32
The essence of the test for property is therefore a search for the
heritage of the interest, the route from its creation. If the interest can
Once it is determined that due process applies, the question remains what process
is due.
The Roth-Sindermann facts, however, provide a convenient comparative setting for explain-
ing the new approach. Moreover, the Roth decision has been the focal point of the judiciary
and commentators in the new due process perspective.
30. Roth and Sindermann had been teachers at a Wisconsin university and a Texas
college respectively. Neither was employed by virtue of a written contract granting tenure.
Roth's contract granted employment for a twelve month period for his first teaching post;
Sindermann had a twelve month contract for his tenth year of teaching in the state univer-
sity and college system. In both cases the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether an
interest in liberty or property was at stake. Roth's claim did not establish a safeguarded
interest, but Sindermann's claim did succeed. An important procedural distinction was that,
while neither substantive matter had gone beyond summary judgment, such judgment had
favored Roth but had gone against Sindermann. Therefore, in the latter case the reviewing
court was able to assume a broad factual base for the petitioner's claim.
31. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577. The test was restated by the Court in
Sindermann as follows: "A person's interest in a benefit is a 'property' interest for due pro-
cess purposes if there are such rules or mutually explicit understandings that support his
claim of entitlement to the benefit and that he may invoke at a hearing." Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. at 601.
32. The Court said that "[e]xplicit contractual provisions may be supplemented by other
agreements implied from 'the promisor's words and conduct in the light of the surrounding
circumstances' ... [3A. Corbin on Contracts § 562 (1960)]." Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S.
at 602.
Those surrounding circumstances and understandings consisted of Sindermann's ten
years of service in the state higher education system, his four years of service with his current
employer, an employer's publication indicating that a faculty member might assume perma-
nent tenure would be forthcoming as long as teaching services and work environment rela-
tionships were satisfactory, and a statewide guideline which indicated that tenure might be
assumed after a probationary period of employment not exceeding seven years.
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be traced to a basis extending a legitimate claim of entitlement, it prima
facie warrants a property identity. However, there may be a limitation
on that identity built into the legitimating basis. For example, as in
Roth and Sindermann, a written contract extending employment-on
its face a legitimate basis for a property interest 33-might constrain that
property interest by limiting the duration of the employment. Only by
recourse to the law of contracts could that employment (property) in-
terest be extended beyond the date set out in the written contract.
34
Thus Sindermann's property interest in employment, on proper appli-
cation of the law of contracts, would extend as long as his teaching
services and work environment relationships were satisfactory. If dis-
missal from employment occurred for some other reason, the property
interest would be impinged upon and due process would be invoked.
35
Given the tactile logic of the Roth-Sindermann approach, its
uniqueness might be overlooked. A considerable change had occurred,
however. The words "life, liberty, and property" generally had been
regarded as descriptive of constitutionally protected interests, rather
than delineating the outer boundaries of those interests. In previous
cases where "property" had been disputed, that factor was but one
component of a broader evaluation of a due process claim; the analysis
also took into account the nature of the procedures by which the prop-
33. It is well established that employment may be a property interest. In Roth there was
some enumeration of adjudged property interests. Such an interest is broader than actual
ownership of real estate, chattels, or money. See Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207
(1970); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971). The
Goldberg case embraced as property an interest in continued receipt of welfare benefits
under statutory and administrative standards defining eligibility. The concept of property
also includes an interest attached to public employment, whether in an office of continuing
employment secured by tenure, Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 U.S. 551 (1956), or by
contract, Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952). Additionally, employment in the ab-
sence of tenure or formal contract amounts to a property interest where there is a clearly
implied promise of continued employment. Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. at 208.
34. It is arguable that Sindermann is unclear as to whether a full contractual right, ex-
press or implied, was needed as a base for petitioner's claim, or whether some lesser entitle-
ment would have been sufficient. While this is a point from which differing reasonable
conclusions might be drawn, the language of the Supreme Court in its reference to contract
doctrines and textbooks indicates a preoccupation with the need for a full contractual right.
35. One might wonder why an employee threatened with dismissal should bother with a
due process claim, pregnant with federal complications, when a purely private action in
contract is available. An answer is found in the types of remedies afforded by each. The
due process guarantee traditionally has been understood to operate before deprivation of
property, see, e.g., Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971), whereas other remedies might not
operate until after damage has been suffered. While an injunction based on impending
contractual damage might be available before deprivation of property-subject, of course, to
the rules concerning equity's involvement with master-servant relationships-such barrier to
dismissal offers no intrinsic right to a pre-deprivation hearing.
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erty was to be deprived.36 This analysis was changed by Roth; only
after the existence of a property interest is established can there be an
inquiry as to the propriety of procedures. The logic of the Court's new
policy has value only if two assumptions are made regarding the due
process clauses: 1) that such clauses exalt the interests in life, liberty,
and property as well as constraining government deprivation of these
interests; and, 2) that they proscribe any protection for interests other
than those included within the definition of life, liberty, and property.
The first assumption can be made without great difficulty; the second,
however, is far more tenuous.
There are further aspects of the Roth and Sindermann cases which
are essential to an understanding of the current interpretation of the
due process guarantee. These will be considered below in light of more
recent cases. First, the language of the legitimate basis test identifies
state law as a source of property interest, but not the only source. Yet
the Court in Sindermann, citing Roth, was careful to conclude that the
existence of Sindermann's entitlement was ultimately to be determined
by state law.37 The case was remanded to the district court for a deter-
mination of whether Texas law recognized or prohibited job tenure.
Therefore, the states seem to have a veto over property interests.
Where state legislation is silent, rules and understandings derived from
other bases can be used to interpret a contract; but if Texas law ex-
pressly withheld tenure from one in the position of Sindermann, such
rules and understandings would be nullified. The state thus wields a
"two-edged sword" 38 in carving out property entitlements.
Secondly, the test by which Roth and Sindermann diverged was
addressed to a delineation of property interests, but not to liberty inter-
ests. The point is vital, but has perhaps been overlooked in later deci-
sions. Neither Roth nor Sindermann held that liberty interests are
created and their dimensions defined by rules and understandings
which stem from a source independent of the Constitution, such as
state law. To the contrary, the Court drew attention to one of its earlier
decisions where some content of "liberty" had been set out:
Without doubt, it [liberty] denotes not merely freedom from bodily
restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in
any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge,
to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God
according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to en-
36. See note 6 supra.
37. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. at 602.
38. Id. at 603.
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joy those privileges long recognized. . . as essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men.
3 9
Although it can readily be acknowledged that the state may partially
truncate or regulate these attributes, can it be said that it endows lib-
erty? Or if liberty does emanate from the state, is that the only source?
The answers to these questions will be considered shortly.
E. Case Law After Roth and Sindermann
In three decisions handed down in 1974, 1975, and 1976, the
United States Supreme Court displayed considerable variation on the
import of Roth. In the first decision, Arnett v. Kennedy,4' Justice Rehn-
quist, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart, announced
the judgment of the Court in terms which reflected the logic of Roth:
"[Tlhe property interest which appellee had in his employment was it-
self conditioned by the procedural limitations which had accompanied
the grant of that interest."' 4' This language evinces a concern for the
extent of the property interest which the claimant/appellee asserted.
Yet, a question is raised as to the roots of that interest and its perimeter.
The appellee's concern was for procedures other than those provided.42
For the plurality, the perimeter of the property interest in employment
was reached in the circumstances giving rise to the termination of that
employment, and therefore the challenged procedures did not cross the
due process evaluation threshold.
39. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 572. The context was a quotation from
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
40. 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
41. Id. at 155.
42. The relevant provisions were found in 5 U.S.C. § 7501 (repealed 1978):
(a) An individual in the competitive service may be removed or suspended with-
out pay only for such cause as'will promote the efficiency of the service.
(b) An individual in the competitive service whose removal or suspension with-
out pay is sought is entitled to reasons in writing and to-
(1) notice of the action sought and of any charges preferred against him;
(2) a copy of the charges;
(3) a reasonable time for filing a written answer to the charges, with affida-
vits; and
(4) a written decision on the answer at the earliest practicable date.
Examination of witnesses, trial, or hearing is not required but may be provided in
the discretion of the individual directing the removal or suspension without pay
The appellee in Arneut had sought a trial-type hearing before an impartial hearing officer.
The officer who had upheld written administrative charges against the appellee, including a
finding that allegations of attempted bribery were unfounded, was himself the target of those
allegations.
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In an unusual distribution of conclusions, the majority of the jus-
tices joined forces against the view of the Roth test in the plurality
opinion. Justices Powell and Blackmun expressed sentiments shared
by four other justices:
The plurality opinion evidently reasons that the nature of appellee's
interest in continued federal employment is necessarily defined and
limited by the statutory procedures for discharge and that the consti-
tutional guarantee of procedural due process accords to appellee no
procedural protections against arbitrary or erroneous discharge other
than those expressly provided in the statute. The plurality would
thus conclude that the statute governing federal employment deter-
mines not only the nature of appellee's property interest, but also the
extent of the procedural protections to which he may lay claim. It
seems to me that this approach is incompatible with the principles
laid down in Roth and Sindermrann. Indeed, it would lead directly to
the conclusion that whatever the nature of an individual's statutorily
created property interest, deprivation of that interest could be accom-
plished without notice or a hearing at any time. This view miscon-
ceives the origin of the right to procedural due process. That right is
conferred, not by legislative grace, but by constitutional guarantee.
While the legislature may elect not to confer a property interest in
federal employment, it may not constitutionally authorize the depri-
vation of such an interest, once conferred, without appropriate proce-
dural safeguards.43
This passage emphasizes the conflicting interpretations of Roth. The
question was whether the facts should be characterized as government
deprival of a conferred interest, or simply the exhaustion of an interest
pursuant to its own inherent limitations. While the plurality opinion
was of the latter view, only differing conclusions about the effects of the
answers to that question permitted it to hold the day. Which was the
correct view? The plurality directly applied the scheme of Roth. The
reference by Justices Powell and Blackmun to that case and to
Sindermann was indicative of a failure, or unwillingness, to grasp the
import of the dicta therein, notwithstanding Roth's "principles."
The plurality approach of Arnett lost ground in Goss v. Lopez.'
The issue there was whether Ohio school authorities could suspend stu-
dents without procedures meeting a due process standard. In finding
that the constitutional guarantee operated to prevent such suspensions,
the Court followed the "principles" interpretation of Roth favored by
43. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. at 166-67.
44. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
No. 1]
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
the majority of the justices in Arnett. But the application of that view
in Goss clearly portrayed its distortion of the Roth property test. Al-
though Roth had deemed property interests a function of legislative
intent, the Goss decision not only ignored legislative intent but imposed
a property interest where none was intended by the legislature.
Justice Powell's dissent was joined by Justices Blackmun and
Rehnquist. The dissenters' view was a direct application of the logic of
the Roth dicta:
The Ohio statute that creates the right to a 'free' education also ex-
plicitly authorizes a principal to suspend a student for as much as 10
days.... Thus the very legislation which 'defines' the 'dimension'
of the student's entitlement, while providing a right to education gen-
erally, does not establish this right free of discipline imposed in ac-
cord with Ohio law. Rather, the right is encompassed in the entire
package of statutory provisions governing education in Ohio-of
which the power to suspend is one.
45
According to the dissent, the state law which defined the students'
rights to attend school also subjected those rights to suspension for mis-
conduct. Suspension, therefore, did not impinge on the students' prop-
erty interest. If deprivation of property was not in issue, the due
process guarantee had no operation.
Bishop v. Wood' subsequently reaffirmed the ascendant Supreme
Court concept of prophylactic creation of property interests and
thereby handed a balance of power to the legislatures.47 The majority
view was that "[a] property interest in employment can, of course, be
created by ordinance, or by an implied contract. In either case, how-
ever, the sufficiency of the claim of entitlement must be decided by
45. Id. at 586-87.
46. 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
47. One commentator has succinctly stated the effect of that balance in these words:
Various units of government voluntarily treat certain entitlements like property
and provide corresponding termination procedures that satisfy due process require-
ments. Others strictly avoid burdening themselves in such a manner and make it
plain in appropriate legislation that this is their intent. It is the role of the entitle-
ment doctrine to guarantee due process in the former situation and to deny it in the
latter. Thus the legislature representing the unit of government that will bear the
burden of supporting a property interest will decide in the first instance whether to
undertake the burden; once undertaken the courts will enforce the commitment.
Comment, Constitutional Law - Due Process - Property Interest - Government Employment -
State Law Defines Limitation ofEntitlement, 1977 Wis. L. Rav. 575, 601. This commentator
does not address government silence in a given instance. It may well be that, where interests
in the nature of property are involved, government is not likely to be silent. However, if it is,
silence is judicially regarded as a denial of a commitment to due process.
[Vol 5
Right to Fair Procedure
reference to state law."48
The petitioner in Bishop was a former employee of the Marion,
N.C. police force who had been discharged in accordance with pre-
scribed procedures.49 The questions for the court were whether those
procedures were a defining limit on his property interest in continued
employment, or whether that interest was supportable in some other
way. The Supreme Court agreed with the view of the district judge,
based on his presumed understanding of state law, and held that the
petitioner "held his position at the will and pleasure of the city."50 In
other words, the prescribed procedures were sufficient for the dismissal
of an employee." However, a strong dissent by Justices White, Bren-
nan, Marshall, and Blackmun expressed many of the same views found
48. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. at 344. (Opinion of Justice Stevens with whom Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Powell, and Rehnquist joined.)
49. Article II, § 6, of the Personnel Ordinance of the City of Marion, N.C., provided the
following:
Dimissal. A permanent employee whose work is not satisfactory over a period of
time shall be notified in what way his work is deficient and what he must do if his
work is to be satisfactory. If a permanent employee fails to perform work up to the
standard of the classification held, or continues to be negligent, inefficient, or unfit
to perform his duties, he may be dismissed by the City Manager. Any discharged
employee shall be given written notice of his discharge setting forth the effective
date and reasons for his discharge if he shall request such a notice.
50. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. at 345.
51. In a strong criticism of the outcome of the case, Professor Van Astyne said:
In brief, Carl Bishop as a 'permanent employee', has even less fourteenth amend-
ment property than had David Roth, probationary employee at Oshkosh, Wiscon-
sin. Roth had the enforceable assurance of at least the one year of assistant
professor status (which he had completed) before encountering the hazard of non-
renewal.
Van Alstyne, supra note 14, at 468. There were, however, dismissal procedures applicable to
Roth during his probationary employment; those simply were not in issue. Professor Van
Alstyne continues:
Although unknown to him, Carl Bishop as a 'permanent employee' literally had no
job even from day to day, but was dependent upon the non-happening of an event
(receipt of notice of dismissal from the City Manager) as a condition precedent to
vest affirmatively in him each day's entitlement to his status.
Id. at 468-69.
A more accurate comparison of the cases might be based on more precise use of lan-
guage. It is implicit in the foregoing extract that job is regarded aspropery-at least it
should be so regarded. But that view projects all the concepts which can describe one's
interest in employment into the notion of property. An alternative view, which might help
to explain the Supreme Court's position, is that one can have a reasonable expectation that
employment will continue from year to year. Of course, such expectation does not fall into
the class of property protected by the Constitution (although the author would argue that it
should not be prima facie excluded); however, Professor Van Alstyne appears to have over-
looked the Roth allowance for "understandings." His comment would have been more pre-
cise if it had included the word "property" in two places: after "job" and before "status."
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in the Arnett dissent.52
The debate over the correct interpretation of the Roth test should
have been laid to rest by this time. The dicta setting out the property
test in Roth and in Sindermann were clear; a critical component of a
due process claim would be the establishment of a property interest.
An attack of those cases could only take the form of the "principles"
view of the Constitution expressed in Arnett, but Arnett's reliance on
Roth as constituting an application of those principles was erroneous.
Nevertheless, some extension of the Roth decision occurred in Arnett.
In Arnett the Court could have concluded that the statute granting the
appellee's employment satisfied a Roth property test and then gone on
to measure the contested procedures against a due process standard.
However, the Court avoided that path by regarding the substantive
grant of the right and the procedural limitations of that right as being
so, intertwined as to warrant the conclusion that the property interest
languished with the termination of employment. There is something to
be said for the contextual force of that view. The proximity of the stat-
utory grant and procedural qualifications lends weight to the opinion
that Congress intended the substantive grant to be inherently limited.
That opinion, however, was judicial, not legislative, and the question
surely merited examination of the legislative history. The issue was
properly one of legislative intent, as deemed by Roth. The issue should
have been whether Congress intended that which was being endowed
to be a peculiarly procedure-terminated substantive grant, or whether
Congress instead was concerned with both the substantive grant and
the question of procedures for termination and appeal. If the latter was
the correct intent of the statute, then the Roth threshold would have
been established and the Court would have then been free to measure
the procedures against the due process standard. Because of the broad
practical reach of legislation similar to that at issue, a more thorough
evaluation of legislative intent was crucial. Finally, Bishop v. Wood
compounded the Roth-Arnett revolution. According to one commenta-
tor, the deceptively simple analysis of Bishop leads to undesirable re-
sults by relegating due process protection to the legislatures.5 3
52. According to the dissenters:
The ordinance plainly grants petitioner a right to his job unless there is cause to fire
him. Having granted him such a right it is the Federal Constitution, not state law,
which determines the process to be applied in connection with any state decision to
deprive him of it.
Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. at 360-61 (opinion by Blackmun, J.).
53. This commentator states:
The analysis employed by the Court in the unassuming case of Bishop v. Wood is
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F. The Liberty Component
The liberty and property components of due process protection
frequently interact. When property interests are impinged, some depri-
vation of liberty often occurs as well. It is difficult to distinguish be-
tween the infringement of separate liberty and property interests and
the infringement of liberty because of the infringement of property.
For example, in Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Local 573 v. McEl-
roy,54 a concessionaire's employee was not allowed to enter a restricted
weapons production area. A major question was whether liberty was at
stake. The majority view was that no "government action has operated
to bestow a badge of disloyalty or infamy, with an attendant foreclo-
sure from other employment opportunity."' "5 Was the Court consider-
ing an interest distinct from property--"the right to follow a chosen
trade or profession"?5 6 That is, can the passage be regarded as
countenancing a separate liberty interest in that the government might
not bestow a "badge" even if other employment opportunity is not
foreclosed? 7 Or is the government merely forbidden to do indirectly
what it should not do directly: the effective denial of future employ-
ment, a property interest, by injury to reputation, a liberty interest? To
the extent that the pre-Roth cases evaluated the interest at stake, liberty
was seen as clearly distinct from property.58 In fact, Roth enumerated
some prior judicially endorsed liberty attributes.59 The dicta in Roth
indicate that an individual has the right to be free of charges that might
seriously damage standing and association in the community, e.g.,
charges of dishonesty or immorality. Standing embraces "good name,
reputation, honor, or integrity." 60 Further, one is entitled to freedom
deceptively simple: to invoke the due process clause one must have a protected
interest at stake; to have a protected interest one must have an entitlement under
state law; the dimensions of that entitlement are measured by the procedures which
the state established to guard the interest. Application of the analysis, however,
produces powerful and undesirable results. Constitutional inquiry is vitiated un-
der Bishop, and procedural protection becomes totally a function of statutory
grant.
Note, Democratic Due Process: Administrative Procedure After Bishop v. Wood, 1977 DUKE
L.J. 453, 454.
54. 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
55. Id. at 898.
56. Id. at 895-96.
57. This certainly was a dissenting view. Justice Brennan, with whom Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Black and Douglas joined, believed that attachment of a "badge of
infamy" required a prior hearing. Id. at 902.
58. See, ag., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
59. See note 39 and accompanying text supra.
60. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972).
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from the stigma or other disability ensuing from a failure to re-employ,
similar to that alluded to in Cafeteria Workers.61 Neither Roth nor
Sindermann were considered to have suffered an infringement of lib-
erty interests.62 On the other hand, it was acknowledged that state ac-
tion such as enactment of regulations barring Roth from all other
public employment in state universities would be an attack on liberty.63
Liberty interest evaluation was a minor aspect of the Roth and
Sindermann decisions; the cases are of primary importance for setting
out the property interest test. And the dicta in the cases which fol-
lowed-Arnett, Goss, and Bishop-added little to the pre-Roth under-
standing of liberty.' However, the decisions are of some value in a
discussion of the liberty interest because they display the differing con-
clusions reached after applying that understanding of liberty to various
factual situations. For example, in Goss the infringement on liberty
was an equal component of the decision in favor of the student peti-
tioner, in addition to the infringement of property by the challenged
action. It was held that charges of misconduct could seriously damage
students' standing with fellow students and teachers, as well as interfere
with later opportunities for higher education and employment.65 In the
dissenting opinion, Justice Powell discounted the implications of the
misconduct charge so as to deny that liberty interests were endangered.
He managed this by a subtle shift of emphasis from the charges of mis-
conduct to the suspension which followed. Whereas the majority had
made clear the weighty implications of such charges in later life, 66 Jus-
tice Powell focused on the light nature of a ten day suspension. Refer-
ring to Roth, he pointed out the need for serious damage to reputation
to invoke constitutional protection, and concluded that a ten day sus-
pension was less damaging to the student's reputation than the dismis-
sal of the untenured teacher in Roth.67
61. See text accompanying note 55 supra.
62. But see the dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. at 584-85 and of Justice Marshall, id. at 589.
63. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 573-74.
64. However, it could be said that Bishop involved substantive change insofar as the
case suggested that injury to reputation must be actual rather than potential.
65. In Goss, the Court held that "the claimed right of the State to determine unilaterally
and without process whether that misconduct has occurred immediately collides with the
requirements of the Constitution." Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975). On the dicta of,
for example, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), this could be accepted as a firm fac-
tual base for the due process guarantee. See text accompanying note 39 supra.
66. In a footnote to the opinion, it was pointed out that the appellee claimed many
employers request information such as suspension records from schools. 419 U.S. at 575 n.7.
67. In his dissent, Justice Powell stated the following:
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Justice Powell's approach in Goss was a signal of what was to
come in the later case of Paul v. Davis.6" Delivering the opinion of the
Court, Justice Rehnquist narrowed the range of liberty interests pro-
tected by the fourteenth amendment. The basis for that holding was an
interpretation of previous decisions which placed emphasis on the dis-
tinction between damage to reputation per se and the loss of some sta-
tus in addition to the defamation.69 In Paul v. Davis, the defamation
consisted of a publicly distributed police flyer identifying Davis as a
shoplifting suspect. But there was no consequence analogous to a sus-
pension, dismissal, or failure to be rehired.70 Justice Rehnquist was
therefore able to distinguish previous decisions which found a due pro-
cess violation by using a defamation/consequences analysis-that is,
consequences involving deprivation of liberty or property interests had
to accompany defamation. Reputation alone was not a liberty interest,
and Davis therefore could not invoke the protection of the fourteenth
amendment.
In his opinion in Paul v. Davis, Justice Rehnquist expressed some
concern for a restriction on the ambit of due process protection. The
claimant's case was said to require a reading of the fourteenth amend-
ment which would make it "a font of tort law to be superimposed upon
whatever systems may already be administered by the States."'" But
Underscoring the need for 'serious damage' to reputation, the Roth Court held that
a nontenured teacher who is not rehired by a public university could not claim to
suffer sufficient reputational injury to require constitutional protection. Surely a
brief suspension is of less serious consequence to the reputation of a teenage
student.
Id. at 589. This analysis does not take into consideration the reasons for the non-rehiring of
the teacher and the suspension of the student, however. No charges of misconduct were
made against Roth; non-rehiring could have occurred for reputation-neutral reasons.
68. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
69. For example, using the Goss and Roth cases as an illustration, there is a distinction
between the charges of misconduct levelled at students and their consequent suspension
from school; between the (lack of) charges against a non-tenured teacher and his consequent
failure to be rehired. A passage from an earlier decision, approved in Roth, to the effect
that: "Where a person's good name, reputation, honor or integrity is at stake because of
what the government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential"
was acknowledged to support Davis' claim only if "read that way." 424 U.S. at 708 (citing
Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971)). It was ambiguous in its reference to
"what the government was doing." Ambiguous, in that the passage could refer to the defa-
mation-or to the accompanying consequences. Davis' interpretation was the former;, that
of Justice Rehnquist was the latter.
70. However, the claimant did resign from his job as a consequence of the issue. See
Causes ofPopular Dissatisfaction with the Administration fJustice: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm on Constitutional Rz'ghts ofthe Senate Comm on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-
6 (1976) (testimony of Edward Charles Davis).
71. 424 U.S. at 701.
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that result need not follow from Davis's claim. The state is empowered
to inflict deprivation of liberty-which if done by an individual might
be classified as a tort-provided it constructs a constitutional base for
its operation.72 But a person in a position similar to that of the claim-
ant in Paul v. Davis would have an action if due process had not been
observed; a decision would go against that person if appropriate legis-
lation empowered the injury and if the infliction of the injury were
carried out in accordance with prescribed procedures, tested against the
due process standard. Davis's claim could have been decided on this
basis. Such an approach would have avoided much of the criticism
which has been leveled at the decision.7 In particular, this approach
would have avoided the conclusion of the Court that precedent does
not allow reputation alone, without some tangible consequences to an
interest such as employment, to be either liberty or property.74 The
"wholly startling re-rationalization ' 75 of the earlier cases might thereby
have been avoided.76
What, then, is the nature of liberty protected by due process after
Paul v. Davis? On a narrow reading, the decision does not restrict the
range of liberty interests but applies only a functional impediment to a
deprivation of liberty claim. That is, it simply requires that derogation
from reputation be articulated through a consequence to liberty or
72. This could be done by analogy to the rules for testing a discrimination addressed by
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, summarized in Lindsley v. Natu-
ral Carbonic, 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1910). Otherwise, the general test set out in Williamson v.
Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955), by Justice Douglas would govern:
[Tihe law need not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to be con-
stitutional. It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it
might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to cor-
rect it.
73. See Monaghan, Of "Libert" and "Property", 62 CORNELL L. REv. 405 (1977);
Note, Reputation, Stigma and Section 1983: The Lessons ofPaul v. Davis, 30 STAN. L. REv.
191 (1977).
74. This conclusion seems to have been fundamentally at odds with the spirit, if not the
letter, of Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
75. This is the phrase of Professor Monaghan, supra note 73.
76. An alternative to the analysis in Paul v. Davis has been suggested by Professor
Monaghan, supra note 73, at 433-34. It would also include within the fourteenth amend-
ment a much broader range of liberties-the same as those protected by the common law-
but would focus on the due process end of the fourteenth amendment's impact. A prior
hearing might be dispensed with if the state's conduct constituted a tort. A remedy conso-
nant with due process would thereby be avoided. However, a difficulty with Professor
Monaghan's view is that it casts due process as remedial rather than preventative in opera-
tion. This is contrary to the traditional understanding of the due process guarantee which
would invoke the safeguards of the fourteenth amendment at the time deprivation of a pro-
tected interest was pending, rather than attaching a compensatory appendage to injury. Fur-
ther, the viability of this alternative is doubtful in the face of sovereign immunity doctrine.
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property.77 The case can also be taken as asserting a broader substan-
tive restriction on liberty and, on such an interpretation, the entire va-
lidity of the case might fall. This broad reading can be based on a
remark in the opinion to the effect that interests attain constitutional
status as either "liberty" or "property" by virtue of the fact that they
have been initially recognized and protected by state law.78 By foot-
note, it is granted that other interests may be protected by means of
substantive limitations on government action-in other words, consti-
tutional guarantees which result from the "incorporation" of the Bill of
Rights into the fourteenth amendment.7 9
Does Paul v. Davis thereby infer that all liberty interests not ex-
pressly protected by state law "were surrendered to the states to be
granted back to the people a parcel at a time as the states deem fit"?80
Such an inference can be attacked from two bases. It has been argued
that the right to travel interstate is not specifically mentioned in the Bill
of Rights, yet it is constitutionally protected.8' Additionally, it has
been argued that the right to obtain an abortion, to use contraceptives,
and to have a proportionately equal vote are grounded in the Bill of
Rights despite the lack of textual support for them.8" It is possible that
these arguments are susceptible to being collapsed together, and even
shoehorned into the footnoted exception to state law protection of lib-
erty mentioned above. Even so, the extent to which Paul v. Davis is
authority for the proposition that state law is the arbiter of liberty inter-
ests, the Bill of Rights aside, brings the evolution of these interests to a
jarring halt. A frank look must be taken at the correctness of that prop-
osition. It is a view not without support in the Supreme Court.
In Meachum v. Fano, the opinion of the Court seemed to rest on
an assumption that liberty interests evolved from either the Constitu-
tion or state law. In a dissent, Justice Stevens, with whom Justices
Brennan and Marshall joined, disagreed with this assumption.
77. It is possible to argue further that the accompanying consequences need only de-
prive one of something less than a full-fledged property interest in order to activate the due
process claim. This argument would be based on the Court's discussion of Roth identifying
the mere refusal to hire an untenured professor as an example of a deprivation sufficient to
render a concurrent impairment of reputation actionable under due process. See Note, The
Interests in Reputation and Employment-Paul v. Davis and Bishop v. Wood, 18 B. C. INDus.
& COM. L. REv. 545 (1977).
78. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. at 710.
79. Id. at n.5.
80. Note, supra note 53, at 464.
81. Id. at 465.
82. Id..
83. 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
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If a man were a creature of the state, the analysis would be correct.
But neither the Bill of Rights nor the laws of the sovereign States
create the liberty which the Due Process clause protects. The rele-
vant constitutional provisions are limitations on the power of the
sovereign to infringe on the liberty of the citizen. The relevant state
laws either create property rights, or they curtail the freedom of the
citizen who must live in an ordered society.... . But it is not the
source of liberty, and surely not the exclusive source.84
Admittedly, the facts of the case concerned a post-trial deprivation of
liberty, which is different from other types of deprivation." However,
the validity of the principles invoked by the dissenters is crucial to an
evaluation of Paul v. Davis, and the Supreme Court has not yet directly
undertaken the testing of that validity. The author suggests that the
dissenters' position is valid; it is in accord with previous judicial pro-
nouncements, although ultimately it must rely on the particular view of
the conceptual structure of society to which one subscribes. If society is
seen as akin to that relationship where individuals have reserved some
integrity apart from the organizational whole, then it is that remain-
der-not "law"-which is the source of liberty. It is at this point that
this digression rejoins the mainstream of the author's argument, for
that same stock of reserved integrity underpins fair procedure rights.
For the purpose of evaluating the state of due process law, it may
be that the hard questions raised by Paul v. Davis can be bypassed.
That is, most claims of infringement of liberty by government action
should find a nexus to either constitutional guarantees or state laws. To
the extent that Paul v. Davis denies the safeguarding of any other lib-
erty, it should not be followed.
A critique of current due process law is not complete without ref-
erence to some other threads which have been identified in the deci-
sions. Among them is the principle enunciated by several courts that
due process safeguards are applicable only to presently enjoyed inter-
ests and not to the refusal to grant a benefit de novo.8 6 This perspec-
tive, insofar as it touches on a property interest, should now be
regarded as subsumed within the Roth test. That is, whether a benefit
is presently enjoyed or is sought de novo is relevant only to the ques-
tion of what rules and understandings surround the existence of a puta-
84. Id. at 230.
85. See Kadish, The Advocate and the Expert Counsel in the Peno-Correctional Process,
45 MiNN. L. REv. 803 (1961); Comment, Due Process: The Right to Counsel in Parole Re-
lease Hearings, 54 IowA L. REv. 497 (1968).
86. See Comment, Entitlement, Enjoyment, and Due Process ofLaw, 1974 DuKE LJ. 89.
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tive property right.87 In the event the Roth test is overturned, the
author would argue that some appreciation should be accorded to the
view that there might be a legitimate expectation of the grant of an
interest sufficient to attract due process protection when taken into ac-
count with other considerations. This subject will be further explored
in the discussion of Commonwealth law.
Roth's test does not apply with respect to a liberty interest. It is
therefore necessary to examine the question of whether the presently
entitled/de novo distinction has any application here. It should be
noted that the cases in which the distinction seems to have derived its
pedigree involved the status of parolees.8 Two types of procedures
were involved: those for determining whether a prisoner should be pa-
roled, and those concerning the revocation of parole and return to
prison. In the first case, it is improper to characterize the situation as
one of deprivation of liberty; that deprivation took place at trial and
liberty was then lost. The consideration involves a grant of liberty for
which the due process guarantee has no application. 89 In the second
case, "a parolee facing reimprisonment stands to lose a 'presently-en-
joyed' interest in his conditional freedom."90 Liberty is being deprived
so that the due process clause can operate.
The presently entitled/de novo distinction is therefore inapplica-
ble to the characterization of a liberty interest. And the reason lies in a
fundamental, but perhaps overlooked, distinction between liberty and
property. There can be no de novo liberty. Liberty is taken to be a
87. Also relevant to the existence of a property interest is the characterization of the
interest at stake as a continuing beneft or continuing burden. For example, in the context of
tenants' claims to hearings prior to rent adjustments, one commentator said the following:
[Ilf one conceives of the tenants' interest as 'continuing to receive the benefit of low
cost housing' rather than as 'continuing to pay a particular rent,' it is apparent that,
given the purpose of the subsidized housing programs, tenants do have an expecta-
tion which is objectively justifiable and therefore deserving of protection as a
'property interest.'
Note, Procedural Due Process in Government-SubsidizedHousing, 86 HARV. L. REv. 880, 896
(1973). See also Burr v. New Rochelle Municipal Housing Authority, 479 F.2d 1165 (2d Cir.
1973).
88. See Scarpa v. United States Bd. of Parole, 477 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1973); United
States ex rel. Bey v. Connecticut Bd. of Parole, 443 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), vacatedas moot 404
U.S. 879 (1971); Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied 400 U.S.
1023 (1971).
89. Of course a prisoner facing parole might succeed in invoking natural justice proce-
dural guarantees. This would be an application of the argument for deeper background
rights. For an application in that context see Monks v. New Jersey Parole Bd., 58 N.J. 238,
277 A.2d 193 (1971).
90. United States ex rel. Bey v. Connecticut Bd. of Parole, 443 F.2d 1079, vacated as
moot 404 U.S. 879 (1971).
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commonly shared attribute equal in maximum content between per-
sons. One person is not entitled to more liberty than another; the only
weighing of liberty is in the process of determining the extent to which
one loses some liberty as compared with another or with one's previous
state. It is in that process that the constitutional guarantees operate.
When the deprivation of liberty comes to an end, there is an automatic
return to the common liberty. On the other hand, property interest
content is as varied as the citizenry. It is culturally accepted that the
status quo consists of some persons having more property than others.
Of course, as with liberty, there can be no unconstitutional deprivation
of property interests. But at that point the analogy between the inter-
ests ceases. To move from one level of property interest content to a
higher level-the attaining of a de novo benefit-is not an automatic
procedure. And whether or not it is a due process procedure depends,
as has been seen,9 on the application of the Roth test.
Another perspective of due process law would place some merit in
the right/privilege distinction as applied to interests subject to govern-
ment adjudication. That distinction was said to have played a role in
due process claim evaluation, but no longer does so. Of course, the
distinction between a right and a privilege is as valid as ever; what the
courts now seem to hold is that an interest regarded as a substantive
privilege-such as a driver's license-is attached with a procedural
right-against revocation without due process. And because it is an
awkward means of expression, the courts have preferred to dismiss any
language of right and privilege. This issue should be borne in mind for
consideration in light of Commonwealth developments, particularly in
the protection of "legitimate expectations."
G. The State of Due Process Doctrine
The Supreme Court appears to have reached a stage where gov-
ernment action is to be considerably free of judicial imposition of a
hearing right. This undoubtedly reflects the personality of the Supreme
Court justices to some extent. In this respect, Justice Rehnquist has
been depicted as a dominating influence.92 But a personality analysis
does not substantially explain the decisions the Court has made in the
last decade, and it follows that it cannot be used to predict those to
come. To some extent the cases can be seen, as turning on the precise
91. See text accompanying notes 25-27 supra.
92. See Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HArv. L. REv. 293
(1976).
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language of precedent, as one is accustomed to observing in Common-
wealth judicial style. This is particularly evident in the wake of the
Roth decision.
The author has shown that a due process fair procedure right is
now interpreted as being wholly a function of the nature of the interest
affected. The "nature of the interest" question in the current state of
the law is unsettled, at least with respect to interests in liberty and prop-
erty. This is not to suggest that one's interest in life is without adequate
protection in due process law.
93
The property test must be seen to be governed by Roth. Although
subsequent decisions have placed differing interpretations upon Roth,
it is the author's view that the Arnett plurality and the Goss dissent
represent the logically correct interpretation. Thus, property interests,
particularly in employment, have been judicially deemed to be the
creatures of government will. Previously recognized principles have
given way to mechanical interpretation of the due process clauses.
Some would undoubtedly argue that such observations are indict-
ments of the state of due process law. It has been said that once Justice
Rehnquist's theory of prophylactic creation of property interests is ac-
cepted, the due process clause loses most of its force and is reduced to
little more than a requirement that the states observe whatever proce-
dures they have actually set.9 4 One might then query the central moti-
vation for a Bill of Rights. Was it intended to be invoked from day to
day with the commonplace of a statute? It may be that an idealized
view of the Bill of Rights' intended place would have it above and be-
yond state action, mandating the observance of procedures properly
decided upon by the appropriate arm of government. That posture,
however, assumes a faith in the capacity of the government to identify
and address demands upon it which might not be borne out in empiri-
cal study.
The liberty interest which might be the basis for a hearing right is
now restricted to an extent perhaps unforseeable by the founders. At
least, that is the case while Paul v. Davis remains good law. Where the
93. However, an obvious area of development is the law of abortion. The New York
Court of Appeals in Byrn v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp., 31 N.Y.2d 194
(1972), denied that a fetus is a legal person so as to short-circuit an argument that due
process was required before deprivation of"life." The Supreme Court has never attempted
to define the term "life," although in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), it held that the term
"person' in the fourteenth amendment did not include an unborn fetus.
94. Note, supra note 53.
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case cannot be avoided, an argument must be made that it be
overruled.
In summary, the state of due process law is gravely faulted in its
inability to clearly define when one has a right to a hearing in the face
of government adjudication. At best, that right is probably rooted in
state law upon which a federal court might be unwilling to pass. It is
therefore difficult to perceive an independent role for the due process
guarantee such as might have been intended by the founders. A more
pessimistic view, although perhaps more realistic, is that the law is sim-
ply unknown. Differing factual contexts might evoke different chords
in the general disharmony of the governing precedent.
H. The Problems of Entitlement Triggers
The cause of this malaise is the current requirement of a threshold
determination before entering into a due process content evaluation. In
what has been succinctly described as the "entitlement trigger" mode,95
due process safeguards depend upon a satisfactory showing of depriva-
tion of "life, liberty, or property." That showing has involved a flirta-
tion with rights/privileges analysis, a benefit de novo/present
entitlement dichotomy, and, for most of the past decade, a structure
erected on Roth.
Without entitlement triggers, the courts would be free to address
the question of whether adequate procedures constrain adjudication by
government. To assume that this is what the courts should do is to
apply a particular normative conception of the role of the judiciary in
relation to government. But that conception is purely normative at its
roots only; some courts in fact perceive their role as that of agents of
society in review of the procedures of adjudication. This is borne out
in the natural justice materials addressed below.
Can the entitlement triggers be dispensed with? Is there a basis for
a hearing right which does not have to be subjected to the due process
threshold tests? The author suggests that these questions be answered
affirmatively; the claim to a hearing is based in positive fair procedure
rights, rather than the mirroring of constitutional constraints upon
government.
Of interest at this point is a recent proposal by Kenneth Culp Da-
vis96 to provide a suitable framework for solving specific problems left
95. See Michelman, Formal andAssociationalAims in Procedural Due Process, in DUE
PROCESS, supra note 8, at 131.
96. 3 K.C. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE 399-403 (2d ed. 1978).
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unsettled by the due process cases of the past decade. Professor Davis
suggests that the Supreme Court adopt a unifying principle that when
officials impose a grievous loss on any person, due process requires no
less procedural protection than that justified by a cost-benefit analysis.
That is, the focus is on the detriment to the individual together with the
cost of proceedings, on the one hand, and on the other hand, the bene-
fits to the person receiving a hearing together with an evaluation of the
extent to which that person's interest deserves legal protection. Thus, a
subjective and an objective test of the importance of interests to indi-
viduals is invoked. It is beyond the scope of this discussion to enter
into an evaluation of Davis's proposal. What is of relevant interest is
the support Professor Davis adduces for his proposal, support which
could equally uphold the traditional due process content balancing test.
Davis relies on the premise that "justice requires fair procedure before
officers may deprive a person of an interest that is vital to him."97 Or,
as restated, "[flair procedure, as such, independently of all else, has its
own demands for constitutional protection.""8 These propositions can
be supported by the doctrine of natural justice. In the guise of fairness,
natural justice can be the touchstone for a judicial due process evalua-
tion. The rest of this discussion addresses that position. An argument
will be made that the due process troubles of the seventies can be hon-
orably bypassed in future hearing right claims. Because the Common-
wealth courts have had ongoing recourse to natural justice jurisdiction
over decisions of government, the argument will benefit from a review
of those decisions. But it will also be shown that natural justice is alive
and well in recent United States decisions. In addition, the author will
demonstrate that the theoretical underpinnings of the due process guar-
antees lie in natural justice and, therefore, in law there can be no im-
pediment to a wholesale revival of that source.
I. COMMONWEALTH NATURAL JUSTICE LAW
A. Commonwealth Analogs
On the assumption that natural justice provides authority for a
hearing right in United States law-that is, that there is no procedural
bar to the input of natural justice concepts in the relevant area of
United States law-a question arises which is the Commonwealth ana-
log of the due process threshold question: what circumstances require
that a natural justice hearing be given? Adopting Commonwealth law-
97. Id. at 401.
98. Id. at 402.
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yers' language, thus preserving an analytical natural justice/due pro-
cess distinction, the subject of that question will be referred to as the
"implication principle." The term "implication" reflects the
subordinate status of the judiciary in relation to the legislature in tradi-
tional Westminster constitutional doctrine: where legislation is silent
as to procedure, the courts will imply that natural justice is to run. In
Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works,9 9 the mid-nineteenth century
English Court of Common Pleas set out what is regarded as a correct,
concise statement of the implication principle:
[Alithough there are no positive words in a statute requiring that the
party shall be heard, yet the justice of the common law will supply
the omission of the legislature .... 1o I apprehend that a tribunal
which is by law invested with power to affect the property of one of
Her Majesty's subjects is bound to give such subject an opportunity
of being heard before it proceeds: and that that rule is of universal
application and founded upon the plainest principles of justice.1"1
This discussion will focus on the extent to which Commonwealth
judges have accepted responsibility for deciding when justice requires a
hearing-an attitude fostered by natural justice principles, yet at some
distance from the prevailing United States Supreme Court view. How-
ever, Commonwealth judges have differed in their readiness to ac-
knowledge an "omission of the legislature." In the author's view, this is
a function of the Westminster "judicial review" doctrines rather than a
qualification of the independence of the judiciary in addressing the via-
bility of a natural justice fair procedure right. Since this discussion will
also be concerned with the receptivity of English concepts into United
States law, the author believes it appropriate to review the receptivity
of the implication principle into an environment in some respects
analogous to the American--the administrative law of Australia.
The issues related to the varying content of the implication princi-
ple generally are familiar to American lawyers: the distinction between
a right and a license or privilege; the distinction gained by classification
of tribunals affecting those rights--executive, administrative, "quasi-ju-
dicial," or judicial; the degree to which the choice of remedy has af-
fected substantive law; and the view of those judges who have
perceived the conflict between freedom of the individual from adminis-
99. 143 Eng. Rep. 414 (1863).
100. Id at 420,per Byles, L.
101. Id at 418per Willes, J..
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trative interference and the freedom of the government to administer
individuals as relevant to the development of administrative law.
The implication principle has survived a period of disfavor to rise
again, although recent opinions of the High Court of Australia have
signaled some doubt as to its current usefulness in that jurisdiction.
From the time of Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works until the
1960s, the records disclose many conflicting decisions as to the impact
of perceived constraints on the implication principle. It would be erro-
neous to suggest that Commonwealth protection of fair procedure
rights was as consistent as due process development through that per-
iod. However, the highest courts of the Commonwealth legal system
gave careful consideration to the state of the law in the opinions they
delivered in the mid-sixties.
In Ridge v. Baldwin, 12 the House of Lords cleared up much of the
confusion which had been generated by the categorization approach of
some earlier courts, an approach which hinged the implication of natu-
ral justice on the perceived executive, judicial, or administrative nature
of the decision maker. This approach was abandoned; as Lord Hodson
put it, "[t]he answer in a given case is not provided by the statement
that the giver of the decision is acting in an executive or administrative
capacity as if that was the antithesis of a judicial capacity."10 3 Natural
justice was to be implied in the manner of the earlier decisions, such as
Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works."° The importance of Ridge v.
Baldwin was thus to clear up misunderstandings reflected in the devel-
oping authority against implication. However, the case failed to pro-
vide a more precise test than the older authorities for determining when
natural justice was to be implied. Some effort toward that end was
undertaken by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council'0 5 in
Durayappah v. Fernando."°  The Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of
Works statement was again endorsed and observed. The Privy Council
then acknowledged the individual characteristics of natural justice im-
plication decisions: "Outside well-known cases such as dismissal from
office, deprivation of property and expulsion from clubs, there is a vast
area where the principle can only be applied upon most general consid-
102. [19641 A.C. 40 (H.L. (E.)).
103. Id at 130.
104. H. WHrrmoRE & M. ARONSON, REVIEW OF ADMrSTPATrVE ACTION 50 (1978).
105. This body, more commonly known as the Privy Council, is the superior Common-
wealth judicial body, but its opinions are not binding on the English courts.
106. [1967] 2 A.C. 337 (P.C.).
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erations ... ." Their Lordships then went on to outline the struc-
ture of those general considerations:
[T]here are three matters which must always be borne in mind when
considering whether the principle should be applied or not. These
three matters are: first, what is the nature of the property, the office
held, status enjoyed or services to be performed by the complainant
of injustice. Secondly, in what circumstances or upon what occasions
is the person claiming to be entitled to the exercise the measure of
control entitled to intervene. Thirdly, when a right to intervene is
proved, what sanctions in fact is the latter entitled to impose upon
the other. 108
These three considerations have become known in commentary
and judicial parlance as the "Durayappah factors." The Common-
wealth acceptance of a responsible role for the judiciary in balancing
out the arguments for and against a fair procedure right is clearly illus-
trated by the adoption of the Durayappah factors. Often they have
been expressly applied as a standard of evaluating the natural justice
implication question. Moreover, they have appeared obscurely in other
judgments where the subject matter of the "factors" provided the basis
for evaluation without explicit acknowledgment of the source. The rea-
son for this, at least in the Australian courts, is due to recent -trends to
sever judicial links with the Privy Council. This has been chiefly the
work of the federal government in Australia and its supreme judicial
body, the High Court. In fact, appeals no longer may go to the Privy
Council from the High Court and the latter body has recently declared
it is no longer bound by Privy Council precedents. With this in mind,
one can observe an accord with the Durayappah factors in some High
Court decisions notwithstanding the lack of their acknowledgment. 1"
An early illustration of the Durayappah impact came in Banks v.
107. Id at 349.
108. Id..
109. Thus, Chief Justice Barwick in Salemi v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Af-
fairs (No. 2), 14 Australian L.R. 1 (1977), made the following comment:
In Twist v. Randwick Municipal Council (1976) 12 A.L.R. 379, I endeavoured to
summarize without specific reference to them the authorities relating to the impu-
tation by construction of an obligation to accord natural justice so far as that mat-
ter related to the circumstances of that case. Having again looked at the various
decisions I think that what I then wrote does represent the authorities so far as I
then had need to explore them for the resolution of that case, but that, having
regard to what has been submitted in this case, I have formed the opinion that my
formerly expressed remarks should be supplemented by what I have now written,
which is in accord with those authorities.
Id at 5.
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Transport Regulation Board 110 The High Court of Australia consid-
ered whether a writ of certiorari would lie against a commercial trans-
port licensing board if that board's decision to revoke a taxicab license
was based upon erroneous grounds. The writ is available only against
tribunals required to act judicially-that is, to observe natural justice.
In his arguments in support of the majority judgment allowing the writ,
Chief Justice Barwick displayed a concurrence with the Durayappah
analysis: "The license was property... which provided a means and
perhaps the sole means of the livelihood of the holder of the li-
cense. . ... " Furthermore, "[tihe nature of the power given to the
Board and the consequences of its exercise combine . . . to make it
certain that the Board is bound to act judicially, and that its proceed-
ings are subject to the prerogative writs." 112 The other judges of the
majority were content to assert that the circumstances warranted obser-
vance of judicial procedures without setting out their reasoning on the
preliminary issue.
1 13
A more recent and express High Court acknowledgment of the
Durayappah factors as constituting the implication test came in Salemi
v. Ministerfor Immigration and Ethnic Affairs No. 2.14 According to
Justice Gibbs:
The question whether the principles of natural justice must be ap-
plied, and if so what those principles require, depends on the circum-
stances of each case. In the case of a statutory power, the question
will depend on the true construction of the statutory provision in
light of the common law principles (cf Durayappah v Fernando).1
5
His Honour then set out the three factors suggested in Durayappah and
discussed the case in their light. In summarizing, he stated that:
[a] duty to act in accordance with the principles of natural justice in
exercising a statutory power must be derived from the statutory pro-
vision which confers the power, read subject to the common law
principles which are engrafted on to its provisions... Ridge v Bald-
110. 119 Commw. L.R. 222 (Austl. 1968).
111. Id at 233.
112. Id at 234.
113. Of this decision, the comment has been maae mat:
Quite obviously the judgments fall far short of a full consideration of the problems
involved but it has been generally accepted that the High Court had decided to
accept the approach of the House of Lords and the Privy Council in Ridge and
Durayappah.
H. WirfMoRE & M. ARONSON, supra note 104, at 63.
114. 14 Australian L.R. 1 (1977).
115. Id at 19.
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win . . . Durayappah v Fernando .... 116
The Salemi decision can be regarded as a considered pronounce-
ment of the state of natural justice implication theory. Some comment
was also devoted to elucidation of the concept of "legitimate expecta-
tion," a term arising from English cases. Lord Denning in Schmidt v.
Secretary of State for Home 4ffairs"7 stated that the administrative
body was bound, in proper cases, to give a person affected by its deci-
sion an opportunity to make representations if that person possessed
some legitimate expectation, although lacking any present right or in-
terest. Justice Stephen of the High Court of Australia commented
upon this in Salemi:
[T]he basis upon which the possession of a legitimate expectation
gives rise to a right to be accorded natural justice . . . stems, no
doubt, from the same fertile source as has nourished the concept that
those who possess rights and interests should not, in the absence of
express enactment, be deprived of them by the exercise of an arbi-
trary discretion and without observance of the rules of natural justice
118
By express application of the Durayappah factors, Justice Stephen
went on to find that natural justice was invoked. However, Chief Jus-
tice Barwick expressed some reservations on the extent to which a legit-
imate expectation would satisfy the implication test. In Heatley v.
Tasmanian Racing and Gaming Commission,119 the Chief Justice said:
Latterly there has been what on first impression may appear to be an
extension of the [natural justice] doctrine by including powers which
do not affect rights but which may affect what has been called a "le-
gitimate expectation." I have expressed in Salemi's Case . .. my
own opinion that the use of this expression should not be regarded as
adding to the rule in any respect. The presence of the word "legiti-
mate" in the expression emphasizes that the expectation must spring
from or be associated with legal right.
120
Thus, the Chief Justice, in allowing an association of expectation with
legal right, seems to concede that a right to fair procedures can operate
where the substantive right to the claim will follow rather than precede
the challenged decision. For example, the Chief Justice would seem to
allow natural justice to govern an initial application for a license; the
116. Id at 21.
117. [1969] 2 Ch. 149, 170.
118. 14 Australian L.R. at 34 (1977).
119. 14 Australian L.R. 519 (1977).
120. Id at 521-22.
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license has the status of a legal right and therefore can form the base
for a legitimate expectation, at least in some judicial views. However,
the circumstances of the case before the High Court point out an inher-
ent limitation in Chief Justice Barwick's view. The claimant sought
review of a decision which excluded him from a racetrack. The Chief
Justice, in dissent, said there was no right to enter or to remain upon a
racetrack and the principles of natural justice therefore had no applica-
tion. However, the majority viewed the license to enter and remain on
the racetrack, while revocable by the owner of the track, as a right
against the whole world except the owner. Thus the claimant had a
legitimate expectation that he would be admitted to and be allowed to
remain upon racetracks; such expectation was sufficient to entitle him
to the procedural protection of natural justice.
B. Institutional Departure: "State Action"
This discussion will now focus upon that doctrine which denies
fair procedure rights where the courts have perceived an intention by
the legislature to exclude natural justice. Of course this doctrine is lim-
ited to the exercise of statutory powers, or the "state action"
equivalents in Commonwealth law. The doctrine points out the essen-
tial difference between United States and Commonwealth-or more
accurately, Westminster-constitutional law. The English courts can-
not review legislation, at least not in a "judicial review" sense as that
term is understood in the United States. The Australian High Court
has some power to consider the validity of legislation--there is a writ-
ten Australian constitution which mainly addresses the balance be-
tween state-and federal legislatures-but that power is not equal to the
United States Supreme Court's scope of judicial review.
A concise, contemporary statement of the doctrine by Chief Justice
Barwick of Australia's High Court is found in Twist v. Randwick Muni-
coal Council.2 ' According to the Chief Justice, there is a fundamental
121. 136 Commw. L.R. 106 (Austl. 1976). The full text of Chief Justice Barwick's re-
marks is as follows:
The common law rule that a statutory authority having power to affect the rights of
a person is bound to hear him before exercising the power is both fundamental and
universal.. . But the legislature may displace the rule and provide for the exercise
of such a power without any opportunity being afforded the affected person to
oppose its exercise. However, if that is the legislative intention it must be made
unambiguously clear. In the event that the legislation does not clearly preclude
such a course, the court will, as it were, itself supplement the legislation by insisting
that the statutory powers are to be exercised only after an appropriate opportunity
has been afforded the subject whose person or property is the subject of the exer-
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common law rule that an appropriate opportunity to be heard must be
provided to a person whose property or rights are to be affected by the
exercise of statutory power. However, where the legislature has clearly
and unambiguously addressed the question of whether an opportunity
to be heard should be granted, and has either concluded that no such
opportunity should be given or has made provision for that opportu-
nity, the court is "bound by the legislation as much as is the citi-
zen . . 122 Yet, consistent with this subordinance, where the
legislature has not spoken on the matter, the court is left with a respon-
sible role "to prescribe and enforce the appropriate procedure to ensure
natural justice."" If Commonwealth courts fulfil this role, then aforti-
o the Supreme Court with its power to review legislation can bear
similar responsibility. Moreover, if, as the author contends, the right
which engenders that responsibility in Commonwealth courts is the
same right possessed by United States claimants in similar circum-
stances, the Supreme Court must bear that responsibility. This is true
even under the current Supreme Court view of due process law, as ex-
pressed by the plurality in Arnett v. Kennedy.124 The author has al-
ready argued that there should have been an examination of the
legislative history to determine whether Congress intended appeal pro-
cedures to be just that-procedures-or whether, as perfunctorily con-
cluded by the plurality, they were to be no more than curtailments of
cise of the statutory power. But, if the legislation has made provision for that op-
portunity to be given to the subject before his person or property is so affected, the
court will not be warranted in supplementing the legislation, even if the legislative
provision is not as full and complete as the court might think appropriate. Thus, if
the legislature has addressed itself to the question whether an opportunity should
be afforded the citizen to be relevantly heard and has either made it clear that no
such opportunity is to be given or has, by its legislation, decided what opportunity
should be afforded, the court, being bound by the legislation as much as is the
citizen, has no warrant to vary the legislative scheme. But, if it appears to the court
that the legislature has not addressed itself to the appropriate question, the court in
the protection of the citizen and in the provision of natural justice may declare that
statutory action affecting the person or property of the citizen without affording the
citizen an opportunity to be heard before he or his property is affected is ineffec-
tive. The court will approach the construction of the statute with a presumption
that the legislature does not intend to deny natural justice to the citizen. Where the
legislation is silent on the matter, the court may presume that the legislature has
left it to the courts to prescribe and enforce the appropriate procedure to ensure
naturaljustice. In my opinion, this statement of relevant principle is in accord with
the authorities ....
Id at 109-10. This is part of the statement of principle referred to by Chief Justice Barwick
in Salemi. See text accompanying notes 114-16 supra.
122. Id..
123. Id..
124. 416 U.S. 134 (1974). See text accompanying notes 40-43 supra.
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substantive endowments clothed in procedural language. But now a
further suggestion is made; namely, that the conceptual approach of the
plurality was misguided, and that acceptance of the principles espoused
by the other justices requires aggressive evaluation of procedures
against due process standards.
Returning to Australian law, the author does not wish to imply.
that the relevant Commonwealth law is free of problems; but they are
problems of application rather than disagreement on natural justice
concepts. For example, perceptions of legislative intent differ. An il-
lustration of the effects of such divergence occurred in Twist itself. The
case involved a request to declare invalid a municipal council's order to
demolish a building, an order issued without consultation with the
owner. The order was accompanied by notification that an appeal
might be taken to a particular court within a given time and in a certain
manner. The Chief Justice interpreted the statutory provision of a right
of full appeal on facts and on law as legislative exclusion of natural
justice in the initial decision making. But Justice Jacobs, in a dissent,
argued that the right of appeal did not lead to such a conclusion.
1 25
The third justice, Justice Mason, while concurring with the Chief Jus-
tice in the result, shared the views of Justice Jacobs regarding the impli-
cation of natural justice.
The willingness of the Chief Justice to regard the provision of a
legislative scheme as indicative of intent to preclude natural justice is
consistent with the approach he generally has taken. For example, in
Brettingham-Moore v. Municiality of St. Leonards,1 26 the Chief Justice
denied the availability of natural justice to a body which was the sub-
ject of a government inquiry. His reason was that the statute establish-
ing that inquiry had also provided a procedure for petitioning the
government to forestall implementation of any report produced by the
inquiry. The two other justices simply concurred with the Chief Just-
ice. The decision has been subject to a great deal of criticism.
27
125. Justice Jacobs's comments were as follows:
[A]Ithough an appeal has been given in these wide terms, I cannot conclude there-
from that the legislature intended to exclude the right of an owner in natural justice
to be heard by a council on the question whether an order ought to be made in the
first instance. I see no reason why it should. The nature of the matter before the
council is not altered by the fact that a wide right of appeal is given and the matter
is one upon which a right to be heard is most appropriate.
Twist v. Randwick Mun. Council, 136 Conimw. L.R. at 118-19.
126. 121 Commw. L.R. 509 (Austi. 1969).
127. H. WHrrMoRE & M. ARONSON, supra note 104, at 72.
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C. Excursus: "Fairness"
Another troublesome component of natural justice doctrines is the
developing "fairness" constraint, also of English inspiration. The de-
velopment of a distinct concept of fairness can be traced from the judg-
ment of Lord Parker in In re I.K. 128 In that case, His Lordship
persisted with a categorization approach in spite of Ridge v. Baldwin.
He also contrasted a duty to act judicially with a duty to act fairly and
concluded that in legislative or administrative tribunals-as distinct
from adjudicative decision makers-a duty to act fairly was the extent
of the application of the rules of natural justice.
However, in Schmidt v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs, 29
Lord Denning endorsed the Ridge v. Baldwin obliteration of the classi-
fication approach. He identified the nature of the protected interests to
include legitimate expectation and spoke of fairness as encompassing
all the criteria which might determine whether a right to a hearing
should be granted. It seemed that Lord Denning was not anxious to
follow Durayappah, which of course was not binding on an English
court, but he appeared ready to develop a test based in fairness in place
of the "factors."
A series of cases followed which properly established the concept
of fairness as a distinct entity. In those cases, however, Lord Denning,
in the style of In re I.K., regarded the duty to act fairly as a measure of
the content of natural justice: His Lordship examined the procedures
required under the circumstances, given that natural justice must be
observed. For example, in the Gaming Board Case,- Ex parte Benaim
and Khaida,130 Lord Denning examined Board procedures and found
them to be fair-although sources of information were not disclosed,
some reasons for decisions were not given, and cross examination or
reapplication were not permitted.
In Pearlberg v. arty, "' the House of Lords was presented with an
opportunity to voice its opinion of the fairness development. Unfortu-
nately, little assistance can be gained from the judgments. Lord Pear-
son persisted with a classification approach:
[Wihere some person or body is entrusted by Parliament with admin-
istrative or executive functions, there is no presumption that compli-
ance with the principles of natural justice is required, although, as
128. [19671 2 Q.B. 617.
129. [1969] 2 Ch. 149, 170. See text accompanying notes 102-04, supra.
130. [1970] 2 Q.B. 417.
131. [1972] 2 All E.R. 6.
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'Parliament is not to be presumed to act unfairly', the courts may be
able in suitable cases (perhaps always) to imply an obligation to act
with fairness.
132
Lord Hailsham and Viscount Dilhome took a similar view, but ex-
pressed less willingness to supplement legislation by stating the follow-
ing presumption: "[Ilt should be assumed that Parliament did not
think that the requirements of fairness made it advisable to provide any
such rights for the person affected . . 133
A judgment evidencing the confusion resulting from the fairness
views was given by the Privy Council soon after. In Furnell v. Whan-
garei High Schools Board,134 a suspended teacher sought writs on the
basis of denial of natural justice. The petitioner argued that since the
relevant regulations were silent, the general theory on legislative exclu-
sion of procedures did not apply, and he did not lose his right to natu-
ral justice. The school board claimed that the regulations were a
complete code and the principles of natural justice were therefore not
applicable. The teacher's appeal was dismissed. The majority view
was that although natural justice was not to be implied, the board must
not have acted unfairly. Fairness was apparently being treated as
something distinct from a measure of the content of natural justice
rules in a given situation. Yet some passages indicate that fairness
might be a test for operation of the implication principle, while others
endorsed the English decisions treating fairness as a measure of content
of natural justice.
In Australia, a thorough survey of the fairness developments was
undertaken by Judge Wootten of the Equity Division, New South
Wales, in Dunlop v. Woolhara Municipal Council.'35 His conclusion
was a rejection of the concept of fairness as a test for the implication of
natural justice; he acted in general accord with High Court practice by
asserting that application of the Durayappah factors must be utilized to
determine whether rules of natural justice were to be implied. Further-
more, he rejected the view that the minimum procedural content of
natural justice might be lower than traditionally assumed: "It is far
preferable to recognize frankly that one is talking of something differ-
ent from the traditional concept of natural justice when one is dealing
with lesser requirements which do not include this rule."'136 In other
132. Id at 17.
133. Id at 15 (per Viscount Dilhorne).
134. [1973] A.C. 660 (P.C.).
135. [1975] New South Wales L.R. (pt. 2) 446.
136. Id at 469.
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words, natural justice carried with it the right to a minimum standard
of procedures-the right to an unbiased hearing-whereas fairness
might not dictate that such was necessary. Judge Wootten's view of the
fairness concept was that it should act as a subsidiary safeguard of indi-
vidual interests in cases where application of the Durayappah factors,
qualified by the perceived intention of the legislature, results in a deter-
mination that natural justice rules are not applicable.
Where a function is not one to which it is appropriate to attach the
traditional concept of natural justice, the exercise of the function
should, nevertheless, be treated as subject to an implied condition
that it must be fairly exercised. Fair exercise, as contrasted with nat-
ural justice, would not necessarily involve a hearing, or might in-
volve a hearing on some occasions and not on others.' 37
This was the law applied in Dunlop. Since the statute was silent, impli-
cation of natural justice was possible. However, consideration of the
facts in light of a global appreciation of the Durayappah factors led the
judge to a conclusion against implication. Yet fair exercise of the tribu-
nal's powers required that notice and a hearing be given to the plaintiff
in relation to at least part of his grievance.
Unfortunately, direct High Court support cannot be adduced to
substantiate the thoughtful analysis and approach of Dunlop. The
Chief Justice has again defended an independent position in this area.
In Salemi, Chief Justice Barwick indicated that fairness might be rele-
vant in determining what is required to satisfy the principles of natural
justice where those principles apply; this seems to be a content test
only. The Chief Justice allowed no operation for fairness in the supple-
menting area allowed in Dunlop. According to Chief Justice Barwick,
if natural justice is not implied (which, in his view, would probably be
more often than not), then procedures are governed by the strict letter
of the legislation, unimpinged by restraints of fairness.
This brief exposition of Commonwealth natural justice law is con-
cluded with an excerpt from the judgment of Justice Jacobs in Salemi,
a passage which to some extent draws the foregoing themes together:
It is seldom possible to say in the case of the exercise of any particu-
lar statutory power 'All the principles which have ever been applied
in ensuring natural justice will here apply' or on the other hand 'Nat-
ural justice was intended to be wholly excluded'. The questions
which must be asked are ... did the legislature intend that the prin-
ciples of natural justice should be wholly excluded? If not, what par-
137. Id at 471.
[-VOL 5
Right to Fair Procedure
ticular principles should be applied? I recognize that the search for
legislative intention can be described as somewhat artificial. What
the courts do in the absence of express legislative intention is to en-
sure that power, whether it be judicial or quasi-judicial or executive,
be exercised fairly, weighing the interests of the individual and the
interests of society as a whole.'
38
In context, the phrase "in the absence of legislative intention" means
intention to exclude the implication of natural justice; it is not a refer-
ence to unclear substantive intent of the legislature.
A final point must be made to set some of the above statements in
perspective for those unfamiliar with interpretative practice of the
Commonwealth courts; the judges do not look to the legislative history
or Parliamentary record to ascertain legislative intention. The legisla-
tive intent must be derived from the wording of the statute, within the
confines of the implication of natural justice, if relevant, and other
long-standing presumptions of the common law.1
3 9
D. Contribution from Commonwealth Doctrines
The foregoing review of Anglo-Australian law discloses several
themes relevant to the present discussion. First, there is a general judi-
cial acceptance of responsibility for balancing interests and determin-
ing the right to a hearing. Secondly, this judicial appetite has been
tempered by varying perspectives of legislative intent to allow or ex-
clude a hearing right. However, this qualification is only a reflection of
differing policy stances as between different judges; while distressing
for those who seek a certain meaning for legislation absent judicial
contest, it does not derogate the vigor with which judges generally
adopt their interest-balancing responsibility. Finally, while there has
been a side current in the form of the separate "fairness" standard of
procedure, this has not swept the law from the mainstream natural jus-
tice doctrines.
The responsibility undertaken by judges to carry out interest bal-
ancing is not to be confused with the substantive role of the legislature
in fashioning a compromise in societal interests. That is, it should not
138. Salemi v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs No. 2, 14 Australian L.R. 1,
44 (1977).
139. According to one commentator:
Where some collateral matter arises out of the general words, and happens to be
unreasonable; then the judges are in decency to conclude that this consequence was
not forseen by the parliament, and therefore they are at liberty to expand the stat-
ute by equity, and only quoad hoc disregard it.
I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 91 (J.E. Hovenden ed.
1836).
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be thought that Anglo-Australian lawyers are supporting the
equivalent of conventional American substantive due process doc-
trines. The role of judges in a natural justice balancing test is confined
to the question of whether the context of a claim requires a hearing. It
is a role utilizing judicial expertise. Although the "experts" are apply-
ing notions of justice as perceived by the community, the community
has vested responsibility for that task in the judiciary rather than in the
legislature. The non-elected status of judges can be seen as a form of
insulation to effectuate that task, rather than as an impediment to legit-
imacy. This is not to say that in a given practical application of these
concepts there will never be the appearance of, or an approach to, a
substantive policy role for such judges in interest balancing. Such oc-
currence, however, is the function, or product, of the flexibility inherent
in procedural or adjectival qualification of substantive regulation.
IV. NATURAL JUSTICE AS AN ACKNOWLEDGED
SOURCE IN U.S. DOCTRINES
A. The Fair Procedure Right: Due Process as Judicial Balancing
As demonstrated in the previous sections, where natural justice has
flourished outside the due process environment, judges have assumed
responsibility for balancing the interests at issue in an adjudication to
assess a fair procedure right. More precisely, there has been a balanc-
ing of the nature of interests affected, the nature of the threat to those
interests, and the context of that threat. This judicial style is consonant
with that which prevailed in due process evaluation until the Roth-Ar-
nett digressions. 140 Therefore, if natural justice is to be a legitimate
basis for a hearing claim in United States law, courts will be directed to
that pre-Roth style. To the extent that a return to that style is sought by
United States legal practitioners, a perusal of the legitimacy of the nat-
ural justice base is warranted. To the extent that natural justice is al-
ready relied on by the United States courts in some contexts, and might
140. See, e.g., Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960), where the Court stated the
following:
[D]ue process embodies the differing rules of fair play, which through the years,
have become associated with differing types of proceedings. Whether the Constitu-
tion requires that a particular right obtains in a specific proceeding depends upon a
complexity of factors. The nature of the alleged right involved, the nature of the
proceeding, and the possible burden on that proceeding, are all considerations
which must be taken into account.
Id at 442.
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be seconded to others, that perusal is of value. Such is the scope of the
remainder of this discussion.
B. Natural Justice as a Transatlantic Concept
There is authority in the United States for the proposition that in
non-governmental adjudication-which English lawyers might refer to
as domestic tribunal decisions-the right to fair procedure is to be a
consideration. Such right does not come from the due process clauses,
because government action is not in issue. The alternative source has
been judicially characterized as natural justice.
Non-governmental adjudication involving natural justice rights
has generally been encountered in labor organization or professional
organization membership disputes. Reasons for judicial involvement
in such cases were set out by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Fal-
cone v. Middlesex County Medical Society:'41
When courts originally declined to scrutinize admission practices of
membership associations they were dealing with social clubs, reli-
gious organizations and fraternal associations. Here the policies
against judicial intervention were strong and there were no signifi-
cant countervailing policies. When the courts were later called upon
to deal with trade and professional associations exercising virtually
monopolistic control, different factors were involved. The intimate
personal relationships which pervaded the social, religious and fra-
ternal organizations were hardly in evidence and the individual's op-
portunity of earning a livelihood and serving society in his chosen
trade or profession appeared as the controlling policy
consideration. 1
42
The natural justice basis for such judicial intervention is illustrated
in Parks v. Electrical Workers,'43 a case concerning the procedure for
dismissal of a member from his union. The district court cited with
approval the following passage:
The decisions of the American, English and Canadian courts have
established the common law rule that disciplinary proceedings in a
union or other unincorporated association must be conducted in ac-
cordance with the requirements of due process. These requirements
include the giving of... a fair hearing to an accused member. The
legal necessity for these procedures exists independently of the provi-
sions in the constitution and by-laws of the union or other associa-
141. 34 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d 791 (1961).
142. 1d at 596, 170 A.2d at 799.
143. 203 F. Supp. 288, rev'd, 314 F.2d 886 (4th Cir. 1962).
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tion. The justification for the due process requirement at common
law is to be found in such concepts as 'natural justice,' 'law of the
land,' and 'public policy." 44
While the district court was reversed by the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals, the natural justice point was not rebutted. In fact, there was
some confirmation of the point by the circuit court: "The common law
clearly requires that, to be valid, expulsion of a member or a
subordinate body must be rendered after a 'fair hearing' . . . . The
elements of such a 'fair hearing' often resemble constitutional due pro-
cess requirements. . . . In more recent dicta, there has been some
explanation of this non-consitutional right to a hearing in terms of the
contract between member and union. 146  This explanation, together
with one which focuses on property interests, is a traditional justifica-
tion for judicial review in discipline cases.147 Tradition notwithstand-
ing, this explanation is weak and has failed to resist critical attack.
1 41
Models suggested in replacement have sounded in due process terms:
[T]he courts have close at hand an adaptable concept if they will
recognize that a union member is essentially a citizen within an in-
dustrial government. The function of the courts should be limited to
prescribing the minimum standards for the protection of individuals
within that government. The problem will still be the difficult one of
defining an individual's rights within a democratic society. However,
the philosophy and legal rules developed to protect personal free-
doms in our democracy can provide helpful guides in working out
detailed legal rules to govern union discipline cases.
149
This approach takes a wrong turn at the path between natural jus-
tice and the Constitution. 5 ° Rather than looking to the due process
144. 203 F. Supp. at 307 (citing Sherman, The IndividualMember and the Union: The Bill
of Rights Title in the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 54 N.W.L.
REv. 803, 820-21 (1959-60)).
145. 314 F.2d at 911-12.
146. See NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1966).
147. See Note, Application of a Status Concept to Membershp Disputes in Labor Unions,
45 YALE L.J. 1494 (1936); 24 IowA L. REv. 178 (1938). According to one commentator.
First... [courts] have said that membership in a labour union is a property right
and must be protected against any unlawful interference. Second, they have rea-
soned that membership in a union creates a contract. Any improper discipline is a
breach of that contract for which the law will give relief.
Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discpline, 64 HARv. L. REv. 1049, 1051 (1951).
148. Id at 1056-58.
149. Id at 1100-01.
150. Another statement of the view expressed in the text is found in Chafee, The Internal
Affairs ofAssociations Not For Profit, 43 HARv. L. REv. 993, 1015 (1930): "[A]ny gaps in the
rules as to the procedure of the association or its tribunal should be filled by adoption of fair
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clauses, judicial intervention should be justified on the basis of natural
justice which gives root to due process; the constitutional guarantee of
due process is no more than a specific, governmental application of
natural justice rights."' This is the approach adopted in Common-
wealth countries, and is one which lends itself equally to the United
States polity in spite of differences in constitutional forms.
C. Natural Justice Development: Preservation from Desuetude
Before turning to the roots of the constitutional guarantee, it
should be noted that United States courts have recently had less occa-
sion to adjudicate non-due process issues. This void has resultqd from
enactment of the Labor-Management Reporting Act of 1959. 52 The
Act sets out in the form of a "Bill of Rights" the safeguards previously
implicit in natural justice.153 Whatever need had existed previously to
resort to contract rights or property rights to justify judicial interven-
tion was no longer present; the law relating to dismissal of union mem-
bers had been made clear.'
54
methods, with a reasonable regard to the generally accepted main principles of parliamen-
tary law."
Chafe's view derives slim support from Ostrom v. Greene, 161 N.Y. 353, 362 (1900):
"Common parliamentary rules, in use by all deliberative assemblies in this country, may
also be resorted to, in the absence of any made by the association itself, in considering the
regularity of its proceedings."
151. Cf. the Supreme Court's terminology:
Due process of law in... [the fifth amendment] refers to that law of the land
which derives its authority from the legislative power conferred upon Congress by
the Constitution of the United States, exercised within the limits therein pre-
scribed, and interpreted according to the principles of the common law. In the
Fourteenth Amendment, by parity of reason, it refers to that law of the land in
each State, which derives its authority from the inherent and reserved powers of
the State, exerted within the limits of those fundamental principles of liberty and
justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions ....
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535 (1884).
152. Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1976)).
153. See Lewis v. American Fed. of State, County & Mun. Emp., 407 F.2d 1185 (3d Cir.
1969):
[A]lthough the LMRDA is comparatively new legislation, judicial involvement in
the internal affairs of labor is not. State courts have been reviewing intraunion
disputes for almost seventy years, and since statutes are not enacted in a vacuum, it
is logical to assume that Congress was aware of this substantial body of state judi-
cial precedent when it determined to adopt a federal right of review over internal
union functions. Moreover, in the absence of any significant federal precedents in
this area of court-union relations, the decisions of the state courts can provide help-
ful guides to the meaning of a "full and fair hearing"' as that term is used in the
LMRDA.
Id at 1192 (footnotes omitted).
154. The transformation of the law of labor organizations thereby affected has been re-
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However, professional association disputes falling outside the la-
bor legislation Bill of Rights have continued to bear witness .o the vi-
tality of natural justice principles. The trend of that development, and
an application of the principles, is illustrated in a decision of the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court, Pinsker v. Pac'fc Coast Society of Orthodon-
tsts. 155 Pinsker, a dentist, had been denied membership by the society
without an opportunity to present his case, either in writing or in per-
son. The Court held the denial to be a failure "[t]o comply with theminimal requisites of a fair procedure required by established common
law principles." '156 Nineteenth century English authority was cited for
the principle that "[a] court would provide relief to any individual ex-
pelled from a private association who could demonstrate (1) that the
society's rule of proceedings were contrary to 'natural justice,' (2) that
the society had not followed its own procedures or (3) that the expul-
sion was maliciously motivated."'5 7 The Court then said that "[t]his
common law principle authorizing judicial review of association expul-
sions became a part of California law as early as 1888. . . [and] [s]ince
then. . . has been reiterated in a long and unbroken line of California
decisions."158
The Court found the underlying rationale for this legal right in the
quasi-public status of the association making the membership decision.
Where membership in such an organization is an "economic necessity"
for an individual to earn a living, or where that organization wields
monopoly power and significantly affects economic and professional
concerns so as to be clothed with a "public interest," then judicial inter-
viewed in the scholarly judgment of Minnesota District Judge Larson in the case of Nelson
v. Johnson, 212 F.Supp. 233 (D. Minn. 1961). According to Judge Larson:
[Tihe basic problem here is protection from unlawful suspension or expulsion from
the union. It has been suggested that the common law in this area is not com-
pletely clear. It has been contended that some of the common law theories avail-
able to the wronged union member are without any theoretical basis. It has been
said that the 'contract' is a fiction. It has been implied that the 'property right' is
not more than another excuse for judicial intervention. It has been said that some
courts have been crafty and some have been bold. It has been argued that such
methods have produced uncertainty as to the rights of the union member. But
there is no need to tarry and quibble over legal history, for Congress in 1959 left no
doubt as to the rights of the individual union member. If the law relating to expul-
sion and suspension was not clear before, it is clear now. If there was a necessity to
resort to fictional doctrines prior to that time, the need has vanished now.
Id at 271-73 (emphasis in the original; footnotes omitted).
155. 12 Cal.3d 541, 526 P.2d 253, 116 Cal. Rptr. 245 (1974).
156. Id at 545, 526 P.2d at 256, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 248.
157. Id at 550 n.8, 526 P.2d at 260 n.8, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 252 n.8.
158. Id..
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vention sanctions procedural fairness. 159
It is interesting to contrast the discretion exercised by the Califor-
nia judiciary in Pinsker with the restrictive interpretation of legislation
and regulation in the current style of due process law. The Pinsker
court evaluated the economic and other criteria on which a member-
ship decision was based to determine whether judicial sanctions were
warranted. Similar processes were involved in the pre-Roth due pro-
cess decisions. Is the due process law to be conceptually distanced by
the governmental context of its effects? Or does due process law, prop-
erly understood, summon the judiciary to a responsibility for determin-
ing when justice requires a fair hearing? The latter perspective should
prevail. Those natural justice principles evoked in the labor organiza-
tion/professional association cases, and governing the Commonwealth
courts in similar circumstances, are none other than the same constitu-
tional principles which afford the individual protection against arbi-
trary government action. It is on this argument that the case for a
reinterpretation of due process law is based.
V. NATURAL JUSTICE AS AN INHERENT SOURCE IN
U.S. DOCTRINES
A. The Fair Procedure Right: Natural Justice as Due Process
Accurate evaluation of the roots of due process is possible only if
certain historical contexts are identified. In order to do so, a conceptual
distinction must be made between tribunals which are governmental in
status and the adjudicativefunction of those tribunals. This proposed
distinction has become apparent only with hindsight. Early decisions
affirmed that government tribunals must function in accordance with
natural justice; however, it has been only recently that other adjudica-
tive bodies have interacted with society so as to attract judicial sanc-
tions. It is thus entirely possible that the founders only intended the
due process guarantee as a government sanction parameter, for govern-
ment then had a practical monopoly of the power to make decisions
sanctioned by society yet depriving life, liberty, or property. Due pro-
cess was thus fastened upon tribunals which are governmental in status.
At that time, it might have been difficult to foresee how in England,
159. Id at 552 n.11, 526 P.2d at 261 n.11, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 253 n.11. The Court was
addressing the role of organizations in representing their members, rather than in simply
determining membership eligibility. Thus, it seems that a claim for procedural fairness need
not be defeated on the basis that failure to gain membership or expulsion from membership
would not prevent employment elsewhere.
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and to some extent in the United States, the adjudicative function of
organizations would evolve as the element invoking natural justice con-
straints. In other words, it is the function of the decision making pro-
cess, rather than the pedigree of the decision maker, which has become
the touchstone for natural justice. To that extent, the constitutional
provisions are outside the mainstream of natural justice theory as it
developed in the Commonwealth jurisdictions. Indeed, conventional
due process analysis, in contrast with Commonwealth natural justice
analysis, has been limited in two ways: first, it is an express prohibition
or constraint which is at issue, rather than its implied corollary right
and, secondly, the prohibition is one restricting only governmental, as
distinct from non-governmental, adjudication. Thus, while lawyers
have regarded, and continue to regard, the due process provisions as
delineating the reach of fair procedure rights, the full sweep of the lat-
ter is actually diverted.
It is therefore futile to look back from present institutional struc-
tures and to seek in history the judicial oversight of natural justice
precepts in administrative agency regulation. The need for such regu-
lation is a modern development, coming long after the parting of the
views of the English and American peoples as to how the New World
was to be governed. Of course there was some judicial control, in the
times of Anglo-American common history, of the extent to which gov-
ernment action did impinge on individuals' integrity, but such action
was essentially the regulation of criminal conduct. Thus, in Rex v. Ven-
ables1 60 and Rex v. Arlington, 61 it was held that failure to ensure that
summonses had been duly served upon the parties affected might lead
to punishment of the responsible justices for a misdemeanor in the
Court of King's Bench. Yet natural justice protection did extend to
rights within the jurisdiction of the fledgling quasi-governmental tribu-
nals of those times, as evidenced in the 1723 case of King v. University
of Cambridge.1 62 This was a classic case for judicial intervention on
behalf of property and status. The court held that those who decided
on the forfeiture of office must first give the person affected the oppor-
tunity of being heard.
As government regulation became more complex and diversified,
the courts responded by applying the long-established principles,
whether in the garb of natural justice or due process, to newly
presented issues and emerging seats of societal power. This process is
160. 92 Eng. Rep. 1415 (1725).
161. 93 Eng. Rep. 777 (1726).
162. 93 Eng. Rep. 698 (1723).
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referred to as natural justice "development."' 63 What has emerged
from this development is a reconsidered evaluation of the impact of
fair procedure rights on current societal practices. How was the new
society of the United States of America to respond to the limitations on
adjudication carved out in the English natural justice development?
Consideration must be given to the bases of American democracy, the
Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. As recorded in the
Journals of the Continental Congress, a congressional committee, in or-
der to "[s]tate the rights of the Colonies in general, the several instances
in which these rights are violated or infringed, and the means most
proper to be pursued for obtaining a restoration of them,. . ." agreed
to "found our rights upon the laws of Nature, the principles of the Eng-
lish Constitution and charters and compacts."'" The path from there
was described in one of the opinions from the Slaughter-House Cases:
[P]ersonal rights... were claimed by the very first Congress of the
Colonies, assembled in 1774, as the undoubted inheritance of the
people of this country; and the Declaration of Independence, which
was the first political act of the American people in their independent
sovereign capacity, lays the foundation of our National existence
upon this broad proposition: 'That all men are created equal; that
they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights;
that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.' Here
... we have the great threefold division of the rights of freedmen,
asserted as the rights of man. Rights of life, liberty and the pursuit of
happiness are equivalent to the rights of life, liberty and property.' 65
Thus, the rights of Americans proclaimed in the Declaration of
Independence were drawn from English sources and other European
ideas of the eighteenth century. Louis Henkin recently made a note-
worthy observation on the consequences of that history: 66
"[I]ndividual rights of Americans, then, do not derive from the Consti-
163. The use of that expression is not intended to imply that natural justice rights have
been born in the recent past, perhaps even after the Declaration of Independence or the
execution of the Constitution. The nature of the right to fair procedures is not one bounded
in time such that it sprang into life when the complexity of social interaction reached some
predetermined level Rather, the roots of fair procedure rights-like others encompassed in
Anglo-American notions of justice--are beyond a time dimension. And, for societies shar-
ing notions of justice, they lie beyond a spatial dimension; to the extent that English and
American notions of justice are common, so the right to fair procedures transcends geo-
graphical boundaries.
164. 1 JoUru.ALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRasS 26, 28 (1904).
165. 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 36, 115-16 (1872) (Bradley, J., dissenting).
166. Henkin, Constitutional Rights and Human Rights 13 HARv. Civ. RTs.-CIv. Lm.
L.Ruv. 593 (1978).
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tution, they antecede it. When the people adopted the Constitution,
they retained their autonomy and individual freedoms as personal
rights against their future government."167 Further, "[t]he 'state action'
requirement is also a consequence of our conception of rights as antece-
dent freedom and autonomy protected against invasion by government.
The Constitution does not protect our antecedent freedom and auton-
omy against all invaders; it bars only violations by government."
1 68
This concept of individual rights predating the Constitution
should be kept in mind. In a law review article, Edward Corvin out-
lined the relationship between the Constitution and its "higher back-
ground."' 69 His conclusion is that legislative sovereignty did not
become established in the United States constitutional system for two
reasons:
In the first place, in the American written Constitution, higher law at
last attained a form which made possible the attribution to it of an
entirely new sort of validity, the validity of a statute emanatingfroram
the sovereign people. Once the binding force of higher law was trans-
ferred to this new basis, the notion of the sovereignty of the ordinary
legislative organ disappeared automatically, since that cannot be a
sovereign law-making body which is subordinate to another law-
making body. But in the second place, even statutory form could
hardly have saved the higher law as a recoursefor individuals had it
not been backed up by judicial review.170
The story of the Supreme Court's assertion of the power of review
in Marbury v. Madison 7' is part of every American law school curricu-
lum. It might be argued, then, that the distilling of natural law ele-
ments into the Constitution, posited above the legislative body and
enabling judicial review of that body, has displaced the role of ex-
traconstitutional natural justice rights. Such an argument, however, is
contrary to inferences which can be drawn from a continuous series of
judicial acknowledgments of such rights to be found in early as well as
recent United States cases.
B. The Survival of Fair Procedure Rights of Judicial Review
It is important to distinguish judicial review from fair procedure
167. Id at 597.
168. Id at 603-04. See also J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 49 (1980).
169. Corvin, The "HigherLaw"Background ofAmerican ConstitutionalLaw, (pts. 1-2) 42
HARv. L. REv. 149, 365 (1928-29).
170. Id at 409 (emphasis in original).
171. 25 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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rights, even though both notions have been characterized as facets of
natural law. That distinction is now important because many of the
vehicles for constitutional history have failed to express it; thus, state-
ments by judges or commentators which might have been confined to
natural law aspects of judicial review could be indiscriminately read as
speaking to the natural justice basis of fair procedure rights.
172
The concepts of fair procedure rights and judicial review interact
in several ways which warrant the distinction. Most importantly, while
fair procedure rights constitute a positive item in individuals' integrity
within society, judicial review is a function of that part of individual
integrity which is handed over to society as a condition of entry. It is
therefore rooted in a negative value in individuals' integrity within so-
ciety; individuals are bound to observe the judiciary's ruling on the
constitutionality of legislation. Insofar as individuals enact legislation
through their agents, judicial review is a derogation of their power to
make such enactment. As a consequence, it is logically permissible to
acknowledge fair procedure rights while denying the validity of the
emergence of judicial review.
This logical bifurcation is of course central to Westminster consti-
tutional doctrine. It also allows the argument for observance of fair
procedure rights to withstand a counter argument based on a challenge
of the validity of judicial review. For example, fair procedure rights
can survive an attack which might portray the arrogation of the power
of judicial review by the Supreme Court as being ex ante logically sus-
pect but expost legitimized by societal concurrence, such attack taking
the form that fair procedure rights are also ex ante logically suspect and
would require expost legitimization by observance. A further conse-
quence of the bifurcation should be noted; a claimant who seeks judi-
cial support for endangered fair procedure rights need not invoke the
Constitution, the engine for judicial review. Thus, in the case of a
nongovernment adjudication such as Pinsker,173 the court is presented
with a common law right for which it can draw upon common law
172. For this reason, this Article bypasses detailed discussion of the milestones of inter-
pretative constitutional history. That work, predicated on an exploration of the fair proce-
dure content of the perceptions of constitutional authors, must await another day. The
seminal work for such a study has been provided in Haines, Judicial Review of Legislation in
the United States and the Doctrines of Vested Rights and of Implied Limitations on Legisla-
tures, 2 TEx. L. REv. (pts. 1-2) 257 (1924); 3 TEx. L. REv. (pt. 3) 1 (1925). The omission
here forms no logical gap in the construction of the arguments presented, as there is only
some qualification of the extent to which these views are supported in interpretative history.
173. Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soe'y of Orthodontists, 12 Cal. 3d 541, 526 P.2d 253, 116
Cal. Rptr. 245 (1974). See text accompanying notes 155-59 supra.
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bases of jurisdiction. It follows that the "state action" requirement has
no place in such a fair procedure rights claim.
C. The Fair Procedure Rights: Aura to Due Process
The foregoing analysis will now shift to government adjudication,
the major area of threat to fair procedure rights. The interaction in that
area between common law and constitutional bases for fair procedure
enforcement by the judiciary will be examined. This raises the ques-
tion of whether fair procedure rights against government adjudication
might have existed in the absence of the Constitution; however, since
these rights have no embodiment other than the Constitution, are they
thereby quantified? That is, since the Constitution provides the back-
drop for interplay between the judiciary and the legislature, how can
common law concepts sway due process interpretation? There are two
independent answers to those questions. The more radical response
would be that there is an extraconstitutional basis for jurisdiction over
the legislature insofar as it infringes fair procedure rights. That juris-
diction springs from the nature of the right asserted. That response is
raised here for notice rather than argument; while supportable, there
would be grave problems in reconciling the position stated with the
jurisdictional theories of courts operating in Westminster-style consti-
tutional structures. The preferable response is that fair procedure
rights constitute an aura to the body of protection afforded by the due
process constraints. That is, the Constitution remains the jurisdictional
source of fair procedure rights, but jurisdiction should be acknowl-
edged as granting power to enforce a positive individual right rather
than merely to constrain government action against a claimant. The
positive individual right to fair procedure is common to all who share
Anglo-American notions of justice. As such, it has fostered a responsi-
ble role for the judiciary of Commonwealth legal systems in balancing
the substantive interests of a claimant against other implicated rights
and duties in odt~r to assess whether the right to fair procedures should
be enforced. F_!r procedure rights, as a component of the common law
rights of Americans, should similarly evoke a concern by the Supreme
Court in any due process enforcement to evaluate all relevant interests,
and not only whether "life, liberty, or property" is to be "deprived."
VI. CONCLUSION
A. In Defense
With the author's proposals in mind, the work of some noted his-
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torians will be considered--subject, of course, to the above-mentioned
concern for distinguishing natural law or natural justice commentary in
terms of either fair procedure rights or judicial review. Thomas C.
Grey has made a study of what he terms the "unwritten Constitu-
tion."1 74 His conclusions are expressed in this way:
For the generation that framed the Constitution, the concept of a
"higher law," protecting "natural rights," and taking precedence over
ordinary positive law as a matter of political obligation, was widely
shared and deeply felt. An essential element of American constitu-
tionalism was the reduction to written form-and hence to positive
law-of some of the principles of natural rights. But at the same
time, it was generally recognized that written constitutions could not
completely codify the higher law. Thus in the framing of the original
American constitutions it was widely accepted that there remained
unwritten but still binding principles of higher law. The ninth
amendment is the textual expression of this idea in the federal
Constitution.
As it came to be accepted that the judiciary had the power to
enforce the commands of the written Constitution when these con-
flicted with ordinary law, it was also widely assumed that judges
would enforce as constitutional restraints the unwritten natural rights
as well. The practice of the Marshall Court and of many of its con-
temporary state courts, and the writings of the leading constitutional
commentators through the first generation of our national life, con-
firm this understanding.17
But what of judicial practices after that initial natural rights flirta-
tion? Professor Grey has further focused on parallel developments in
unwritten constitutional history. As seen above, he refers to those nat-
ural rights as being external to the Constitution. But there was also
"the frequent attachment of unwritten constitutional principles to the
vaguer and more general clauses of the state and federal constitu-
tions." '176 According to Grey, of equal importance in this history was
the Civil War. Until that era, the courts acted on the understanding
that external principles were a proper input in determining and apply-
ing constitutional text.1 77 After that time, the external principles served
as a creative stimulant for constitutional amendment and judicial ex-
174. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REv. 703 (1974-75).
175. Id at 715-16.
176. Id at 716. See also Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: FundamentalLaw in
American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REv. 843 (1978).
177. This was not a uniform understanding. See, e.g., Railroad Co. v. Davis, 19 N.C. (2
Dev. & Bat.) 451, 460 (1837); Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378, 453 (1856).
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pansion of the practical scope of review. It was the latter develop-
ment-"the most controversial phase in our history of unwritten
constitutional law, with the aggressive development by state and fed-
eral judges of constitutional principles protecting 'liberty of contract'
against labor regulation, and restraining taxation and the regulation of
prices charged by private business" 17 --which fostered a reaction
marking "the beginning of sustained intellectual and political attack on
the whole concept of unwritten constitutional principles." '179
An inquiry into the bases for that reaction is beyond the scope of
this discussion. The demise of the substantive due process doctrine is
central to the learning of American legal history. However, it must be
noted that throughout the period of judicial defense of the laissezfaire
political and economic theories-theories which were to be purged by
the 1937 Supreme Court-there ran an explicit appeal to natural law.
It has been suggested that the reliance has generated a modem distaste
for the term "natural law,"' 80 together with a perceived association
with Roman Catholic moral theology-a nexus which turns away all
branches of government wishing to be scrupulously exact in avoiding
even the appearance of identification with any one religion or its ten-
ets."' Whatever the merits of these observations, it is clear that the
arguments of the author's brief prima facie conflict with modem reac-
tions to the substantive due process doctrine. However, that difficulty
can be surmounted by separating the substantive due process rhetoric
from the procedural due process safeguards which were, and remain,
the domain of the judiciary.
In In re Gault,i"2 Justice Harlan had occasion to consider the ex-
tent to which the courts should defer to legislative procedural enact-
ments. 183 Noting that the Constitution has entrusted courts, at least in
part, with the assessment of procedural guarantees, and this being a
question upon which the courts possess particular competence, Justice
Harlan drew attention to the circularity of procedural and substantive
issues: "Procedure at once reflects and creates substantive rights, and
every effort of courts since the beginnings of the common law to sepa-
rate the two has proved essentially futile."'' However, Justice Harlan
178. Grey, supra note 174, at 716.
179. Id
180. J. FOLEY, NATURAL LAW, NATURAL RIGHT AND THE "WARREN COURT" (1965).
181. Id..
182. 387 U.S. 1 (1966).
183. The context of the Justice's concurring opinion was a review of provisions of the
Arizona Juvenile Code.
184. 387 U.S. at 70.
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continued:
The substantive-procedural dichotomy is, nonetheless, an indispen-
sable tool of analysis, for it stems from fundamental limitations upon
judicial authority under the Constitution. Its premise is ultimately
that courts may not substitute for the judgments of legislators their
own understanding of the public welfare, but must instead concern
themselves with the validity under the Constitution of the methods
which the legislature has selected... Courts are thus obliged both
by constitutional command and by their distinctive functions to bear
particular responsibility for the measurement of procedural due pro-
cess. These factors in combination suggest that legislatures may
properly expect only a cautious deference for their procedural
judgments .... 185
This passage thus states the rationale for a distinct judicial mode of
inquiry for procedural legislation. On this basis, the politically irre-
sponsible Supreme Court could block the will of the majority in the
name of minorities while remaining a democratic institution.
Early judicial construction of due process issues did not focus on
the substantive-procedural distinction, as can be seen in the work of
Charles A. Miller.186 Of the renowned Hurtado opinion, 187 Miller has
said:
Justice Matthews wrote that due process of law was "not alien" to the
code "which has given us that fundamental maxim of distributive
justice-suum cuique tribuere." With this rhetorical reach back to the
Code of Justinian, a natural law definition ofjustice, and perhaps the
legal thought of Aristotle, Matthews felicitously, though probably
not purposely, considered as a whole what was soon to be separated
in due process thought, procedure and substance. The Hurtado case
was at least a matter of process, but suum cuique tribuere and distrib-
utive justice are at least a matter of substance. . . . [A] conceptual
division between procedure and substance in due process was not an
assumption of the era . ... "
It is interesting to note that the legislation before Justice Matthews in
Hurtado-the Penal Code of California-lends itself to the very confu-
sion of concepts acknowledged by Justice Harlan in In re Gault.
However, in many other fields of legislation, use of Justice
Harlan's substantive-procedural dichotomy can help resolve the great
185. Id at 71.
186. Miller, The Forest of Due Process of Law, in DuE PRocESs, supra note 8, at 20.
187. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884) (affirming the liberty of the California
legislature to establish new forms of procedure in judicial proceedings).
188. Miller, supra note 186.
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difference in American scholars' ideas of due process. Observers gener-
ally have equated survival of natural law doctrines in America with the
rise and fall of the substantive due process doctrine. But there is a
spectrum of views on the proper scope of due process review; the argu-
ments of Raoul Berger189 might be placed at one end of that spectrum.
Professor Berger has argued that the framers' intentions for the
due process guarantee were addressed to judicial proceedings rather
than to conduct of the legislature. He has pointed out that Alexander
Hamilton, in a clear, uncontroverted statement of the meaning of due
process, restricted the guarantee to the procedures of courts. 190 In a
systematic review of state and federal historical sources, Professor Ber-
ger has made a strong case for an identification of the framers' inten-
tions as the protection of "fundamental rights" by "impartial access to
judicial process and non-discriminatory legislation."1 91
It is conceded that such founding intentions must be contrasted
with the events which occurred in the history of judicature under the
Constitution. The evolution of due process protection was stimulated
by, among other factors, the emergence of administrative agencies not
part of the original separation of powers scheme. However, in view of
the objectives of this discussion, the founding intentions of guarantee-
ing procedural protection are of relevance. That is, to the extent that
interpretative constitutional history can lend weight to the author's ar-
guments, a founding intention to incorporate protection for "funda-
mental rights" is significant. It is not necessary to embrace the
essentialism of Professor Berger's position to acknowledge a discretion-
ary role for the judiciary in testing procedures in adjudication against
due process. For whether or not the judiciary has had a valid role in
requiring substantive due process, or whether or not the current juris-
diction in hybrid domains such as freedom of speech, press, and reli-
gion is warranted by the founding intentions, it is certain that a
responsibility for restraining the procedures for adjudicating interests
in life, liberty, and property is properly vested in the courts. Thus,
where Archibald Cox has noted that the Supreme Court's "persistent
189. Berger, The Fourteenth Amendment: The Framers'Design, 30 S. CAROLINA L. Rnv.
495 (1979).
190. According to Professor Berger.
In one of the most illuminating statements in legal history, Alexander Hamilton
stated on the eye of the Convention: -'The words 'due process' have a precise tech-
"iical import, and are only applicable to the process.and proceedings of the courts
of justice. They can never be referred to ai act of the legislature.'
Id at 505. (emphasis in the original).
191. Id..
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resort to notions of substantive due process for almost a century attests
the strength of our natural law inheritance in constitutional adjudica-
tion,"192 Professor Berger's retort-'"To my mind it merely evidences
unquenchable judicial thirst for extraconstitutional power, power that
plainly was withheld" 93 -must not be read as impinging on the role of
natural law inheritance in procedural domains. Again, to Professor
Berger's challenge that "[p]roponents of 'natural law' must explain why
the Founders, who manifestly excluded the judiciary from policymak-
ing, who distrusted judicial discretion, even denied its exercise, could
leave the barn door wide to unlimited discretion under natural law,"
194
a counter argument is supported by the substantive-procedural
dichotomy.
Finally, the recent criticism by John Hart Ely of natural law influ-
ences on constitutional thinking must be addressed.1 95 Ely's concern is
chiefly with the theories of validity ojudicial review; he is a proponent
of the theory which establishes the Constitution as a structural device
enabling the Court to participate in the political process. Therefore,
the foregoing remarks on distinguishing the right to fair procedure
from theories of judicial review represent much of the author's defense
against Professor Ely's disparaging of natural law, or, as he puts it,
"non-interpretivist," theories of constitutional interpretation. Ely's ma-
jor criticism is directed at the weight to be accorded the natural law
invocations of the Declaration of Independence:
The Declaration of Independence was, to put it bluntly, a brief....
People writing briefs for revolution are obviously unlikely to have
apparent positive law on their side, and are therefore well advised to
rely on natural law .... The Constitution was not a brief, but a
frame of government. A broadly accepted natural law philosophy
surely could have found a place within it, presumably in the Bill of
Rights. But such philosophies were not that broadly accepted. Since
the earlier impetus, that had moved the Declaration, the need to
'make a case,' was no longer present, these controversial doctrines
were omitted, at least in anything resembling explicit form, from the
later document.
196
Thus, Professor Ely makes the point that "the adoption of a written bill
of rights constitutes some evidence of a less than wholehearted commit-
192. A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 113
(1976).
193. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 257 n.38 (1977).
194. Id..
195. J. ELY, supra note 168, at 48.
196. Id at 49.
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ment to a natural rights philosophy."' 9 7 However, there is a response
to this point which reconciles some commitment to natural rights with
adoption of a written bill of rights: the protection thereby entrenched
was breaking new ground from the English notions of the superiority of
the legislature in determining the process of law.
Moreover, for practical purposes, Professor Ely's view of the re-
sponsibility to be allowed the judiciary accords with the arguments
made in this discussion. In speaking of Justice Black's dissent in In re
Winship ," wherein the Justice had disparaged the "shifting, day-to-
day standards of fairness of individual judges,"'199 Ely says:
[I]t rings less true in a procedural context. ... [T]he questions that
are relevant here-how seriously the complainant is being hurt and
how much it will cost to give him a more effective hearing-are im-
portantly different from the questions the Court makes relevant in
"substantive due process" decisions .... The question is what pro-
cedures are required to treat the complainant this way, not whether
the complainant can be treated this way at all .... [Wihat proce-
dures are needed fairly to make what decisions are the sorts of ques-
tions lawyers and judges are good at.2 °°
Undoubtedly, the mention of "natural" concepts to many Ameri-
can lawyers carries with it a considerable amount of noise, or static,
generated mainly in the substantive due process demise. Therefore, the
author's message may not be sufficiently clear for some. For lawyers
such as Ely, deeply suspicious of the validity of moral philosophy bases
of reasoning towards constitutional reviews,20' the following argument
is offered: The right to fair procedure, as a catalyst for constitutional
review of legislation, is but a mirror image of the "Constitution-as-
structure" view of the validity of judicial review. The results are con-
current: what the structure theory allows individuals so the right the-
ory requires.
B. Conclusions and Consequences
On the basis of the foregoing discussion, the following conclusions
are proposed. The right to a fair hearing has its roots in English com-
mon law. That right, styled as natural justice, is sanctioned by Com-
monwealth judicial intervention when the judges so decide. In making
197. Id at 209 n.35.
198. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
199. Id at 378.
200. J. ELY, supra note 168, at 21.
201. Id at 53-54.
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that decision, the judges not only take into account whether the interest
at stake is life, liberty, or property, but also give appropriate weight to
the affected interest, whatever its status. This input is blended with the
circumstances of the challenged decision-how it is to be made, by
whom, for what purpose, and with what effect. In short, a global ap-
preciation of the context of a decision leads judges to a determination
of whether to require natural justice. Contrast the Roth style: the due
process threshold is crossed only after the interest affected is accorded
the status of life, liberty, or property. Yet until Roth, the due process
tests were commensurate with the Commonwealth natural justice tests.
And this was proper, for the due process guarantee is but a specific
application of the natural justice requirement.
The Declaration of Independence did not sever the individual
rights sheltered by natural justice. The Constitution entrenched those
rights against the federal government-an extension of the rights borne
by Commonwealth citizens-but did not thereby transplant the source
of those rights nor curtail their concomitant existence with the due pro-
cess guarantee. While the history of that guarantee has been troubled,
there has been no disenfranchising of natural justice rights. Practice in
the state courts points to a continued judicial understanding of the pro-
tection individuals carry in the style of natural justice. What has hap-
pened in the federal courts reflects a constitutional perspective by
American legal practitioners which has narrowed the view of the
greater field of individual freedoms. It is time for change. It is time for
a realignment of the lawyer's focus to gain again the ful promise of
individual freedom. The post-Roth posture of the Supreme Court
should be addressed by briefs which show the greater background of
due process claims. And a shift of emphasis from the actor to the act
will allow individual rights to blossom against arbitrary decision, even
where a state action case cannot be made out.
In summary, the right to fair procedures is a common law attribute
shared by individuals whether in Commonwealth or United States le-
gal systems. Judicial responsibility for enforcement of that right-a
feature of Commonwealth legal systems-was a feature of United
States practice until the Supreme Court digressed in Roth and Arnett.
Where there is a choice between following the "principles" of the ma-
jority in Arnett or the narrow interpretative route of the plurality, the
former path would lead to consonance with former theories of United
States law and contemporary theories of Commonwealth law. That is a
desirable result insofar as it is a manifestation of the symmetry of con-
cepts underpinning the transnational societal systems.
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Something must be said about the impact of a revised attitude to
fair procedure rights in due process application. Clearly if the situa-
tions in both Roth and Arnett were to arise again within that broadened
perspective, the claimants would stand a better chance of gaining due
process review of their circumstances. It follows that there would
emerge a more sensitive attitude by public decision makers toward the
contexts of their decisions. That is, there need not emerge, in the long
run, a resort to judicial redress, thus compounding the proliferation of
adjudication. It is conceded that there would probably be cost in-
creases accompanying the sensitizing of decision makers to fair proce-
dure rights. One cannot ignore the consequences of the Goldberg v.
Kelly 2 ruling. But judicial balancing to decide the operation of fair
procedure rights should take such costs into account, and the resulting
prescriptions should flow back through the decision making system to
retune the adopted procedures. Moreover, the procedures specified in
Goldberg v. Kelly represent an extreme position from which the Court
might eventualy retreat, but this should properly be in the context of a
due process content evaluation.
The process of deciding whether due process requires that fair pro-
cedure rights be observed should be conceptually distanced from the
question of what procedures are thereby required. In this way, some
progress might be made toward reconciling what John Rawls has
termed a "difference in the underlying conceptions of society""0 3 in
contrasting classical utilitarianism and justice as fairness:
In the one we think of a well-ordered society as a scheme of coopera-
tion for reciprocal advantage regulated by principles which persons
would choose in an initial situation that is fair, in the other as the
efficient administration of social resources to maximize the satisfac-
tion of the system of desire constructed by the impartial spectator
from the many individual systems of desires accepted as given.' 4
To the extent that enforcement of fair procedure rights can circum-
scribe judicial intervention in the administration of society, difficulties
of validity posed by the interest representation model of judicial re-
sponsibilityz'3 might be bypassed.
202. 397 U.S. 254 (1971). See D. BAUM, THE WELFARE FAMILY AND MASS ADMINi-
STRATWVE JUSTICE 36-51 (1974). See also Friendly, supra note 9, at 1278.
203. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 33 (1971).
204. Id..
205. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administradve Law, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1667
(1975).
[Vol 5
